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
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Letters

Before the Prince of Peace is born anew . . .

To the Editor:

Your feature article on R.O.T.C. and the accompanying interview with Father Burtchaell are both interesting and painful to read. Your editorial is admirable in its judgment and suggestions. Through its military forces under the direction of Mr. Nixon, the United States is continuing its massive acts of violence against the people of Indo-China. At present the American Air Force is scorching the Cambodian earth and incinerating villages just as it burned, maimed, and murdered for several years in Vietnam. The University collaborates in these crimes against the human race by harboring R.O.T.C. which prepares men for such aggression.

But that is a moral issue, and academic liberals (faculty and students alike) who six years ago gave tacit or open support to American warfare in Vietnam have now become quiet about Indo-China where once again mostly Asian bodies are hemorrhaging. As your editorial justly points out, the status of R.O.T.C. in the College of Arts and Letters — the acceptance of its courses, the seating of its officers on the College Council — is at least an academic concern. Perhaps you can initiate among faculty and students a petition for your suggested general meeting of the College — *not* a College Council meeting — where the problem of recognition of R.O.T.C. can be confronted. That should be done before the Prince of Peace is born anew this year.

Joseph M. Duffy

A concerned correction from the committee: a report of valorous action

To the Editor:

I read with some concern your item "Flush On" on "The Week In Distortion" page of the November 6 SCHOLASTIC. You state that the Committee for Violent Non-Action is the latest and perhaps the best of all movements that have abounded in the last decade. That may be so, but you should be informed that a movement with the same basic philosophy and aims predates the University of Chicago "newly formed chapter."

I am speaking of The Student Violent Non-Coordinating Committee, which was conceived of in the early hours of June 17, 1967 and delivered with resolutions amidst the chaos of New Year's Day 1968. The movement promulgated a charter and had it notarized on January 22, 1968. It adopted a U.S. Army World War

II badge, which featured a lit cluster of dynamite sticks with the words "Blast The Way," as a motto and emblem.

It is a sort of semi-religious, semi-fraternal, and semi-organized "brotherhood" that developed in protest to the world-at-large with the aim of non-coordinating violent activities to show the Establishment what a fantastic waste of time, money, and people their present course of action involves. Any non-coordinated activity, of course, can only be viewed in retrospect due to the chaotic nature of its completion. I am, therefore, happy to announce that over 48 toilets *were* flushed on various floors of Clothier Hall at Rutgers University (New Brunswick, N.J.) from March 1968 to August 1970 by randomly selected members of the S.V.N.C.C. on various unassigned dates. Unfortunately, the action has gone unnoticed by the Establishment.

It is with regard to fairness (on at least an equal time basis) and the hope that the Establishment will recognize our valorous action if it is in print, that I submit this letter to you.

John Peterson

(High Non-Coordinator for the Mid-West)

Leftists? Rightists? Who has the Scorecard?

To the Editor:

I wish to commend James J. McKenzie for his simple letter to the editor in which he failed miserably to discuss the issues, but succeeded to incoherently exhibit his paranoid and frustrated pseudo-intellectualism. I was further impressed with the English Department's stationery. Does James McKenzie usually represent the English Department in such matters? Did the English Department or James McKenzie pay for that full-page ad? Those four inches of print were surely paid for, weren't they? Or did the SCHOLASTIC wish to illustrate the ineptitude of the writer?

This seems to be a time when real apologists, for the sake of simplicity, place labels on people indiscriminately, such as "rightist" or "repressor." James McKenzie, in his reactionary conservatism, would have persons cast into stereotypes and inflexible labels. In my previous letter, I merely took the opposing view of the argument put forth by Mike Mooney, not opposing the writer *per se* as a person. Actually, any clear-thinking person could have written the letter that I had written; not necessarily a Republican or a law student. I'm glad that James McKenzie appreciates this point since he saw fit to use my words and those of others to assemble his point, unfortunately showing his conditioned hate and ability to stereotype. The English Department must be limited in vocabulary these days for one to copy words *per se*. Apparently, James McKenzie *does* find some difficulty in writing a letter to an editor.

I might, add, for the sake of meeting the issue, and to avoid condescending to James McKenzie's tactics, that I never mentioned or intimated repression or rightism, but merely disagreed with a writer's opinion (not via *ad hominem* attack) — an act for which the freethinking McKenzie would have me silenced. Doesn't he know there are people other than leftists or rightists?

I would never condone censorship of press, but only expect journalistic responsibility. All that I have done is inject a difference of opinion by taking a different stance for the sake of balance.

The country and any campus of learning has an abundance of immature and unrealistic emotionalism, while we all could use some thoughtful moderation. A *MODERATE*, Mr. McKenzie — not right, left, pro, con and all the other monsters of fictional nightmares.

Rick Moskowitz

P.S. Concerning your circulation suffering, the SCHOLASTIC need have no fears. Many have indicated to me that few students read it and even fewer take it seriously; excepting some English Department Instructors. But what counts is not a title, rather the content that becomes action and doesn't remain rhetoric.

This is the second letter from Mr. M. to come with "Six cents postage due" across it. Next time, we might not accept. We must, after all, watch our budget and save for rainy libel-suit days.—(Ed.)

Not told as it is, he says

Dear People:

I wouldn't want to try to express what is on my heart, but I can say that it is a more than ordinary disappointment to find that in these days of authenticity and candor and telling-it-as-it-is—that in, of all things, a student publication, one would find an article about an experience with pictures of a totally different experience.

The Sept. 18 issue had an article telling of Mark Delamano's experience at Mt. Saviour with pictures (taken before Vatican II??) in what looks like a French community from heaven knows where. I'll send you a recent *Newsletter* and you can see if it exudes the same spirit as the pictures in your article. The reason I write is that other students may want to try a similar experience. I haven't the least doubt about the sanctity and wholesomeness of the Community you pictured—but as an American I wouldn't go there if I had a Benedictine vocation. And I think American University students would avoid it even for a time.

I don't want to ask for "equal space" and I'm not fishing for an apology of any kind, but I wonder if there is some way we could correct the erroneous impression the pictures gave the article—and an impression that might be disastrous if it turned someone OFF who might otherwise try the same experience Mark spoke about?

Fr. Martin
Mount Saviour Monastery
Elmira, N.Y.

Abbie, Spiro and the gang

Dear Friends,

I would like to point out a certain correlation between two pieces that appeared in last week's SCHOLASTIC.

Professor Hauerwas, in his article on "Should the University be above the battle?" writes, "The disinter-

ested man attempts to formulate his position in such a way that criticisms and objections are not immediately denied . . ." One of my most profound disappointments with Notre Dame is that the faculty especially rarely confront each other in a public manner with their criticisms and objections of each other. How many opportunities do students have to hear two professors confront each other with criticisms and objections for the thought of each other? For example, I (and I believe many students) would love to hear Professors Art Hochberg and Chris Anderson openly discuss the merits and problems of behaviorist psychology (I am assuming that they possess differences of opinion, which they do). Who would fail to learn from an open dialogue between Professors Carl Estabrook and Bernard Norling on a historical topic such as militarism? Or an open discussion between professors on the role of ROTC on the campus, or the position of athletics in personal development, or the place of grades in the educational process?

The debates that presumably occur between professors of opposing opinions should be brought from the safe recluse of the faculty offices to an open forum where students could hear the comments, criticisms, and objections that professors have for the thoughts of each other. The Student Union Academic Commission and the department heads could do much to sponsor public dialogues, with little expense and much profit for the educational experience of the students.

This would do much to reduce the backbiting and personal vindictiveness that prevail among students and faculty that disagree.

To use myself as an example, Mr. Patrick Gooley accuses the SCHOLASTIC, the *Berkeley Tribe*(?) and me of "biased, yellow-to-pink journalism." I am recently told that Mr. Gooley labors on the same student newspaper as I, though we have yet to meet at the time I write this. Why, in the name of Socratic dialogue, did not Mr. Gooley personally inform me of his criticisms, leaving public pettiness to Abbie Hoffman, Spiro Agnew, and the like?

Perhaps professors and students of conflicting beliefs feel that they have nothing to hear from the other person, or that the other person would fail to seriously listen. In any case, it is apparent to me that public and private dialogue between professors and students has largely lost out to narrow group parochialism and pot-shot vindictiveness, to the detriment of all who give a damn.

Could Mr. Metzger, Dean Crosson, and other concerned persons respond to the present lack of public dialogue by proposing open discussions on the campus? I think it would be a good idea.

Dave Lammers
2115 High Street

THE SCHOLASTIC invites its readers to react favorably, unfavorably, with love or with malice—in any case, to write letters. Please send any and all such material to: the Editor, Notre Dame SCHOLASTIC, 4th Floor Student Center.

Editorial

Evaluating the Evaluation

For the SCHOLASTIC, producing a teacher-course-evaluation booklet entails cutting one issue and gearing the staff to the unrewarding drone of uninteresting mechanics. Not unredeeming, however. People do use the booklet.

The cost of printing and distributing the booklet exceeds \$5,000: \$2,500 is furnished by dropping an issue, \$1,000 comes from Student Government, and \$1,500 comes from St. Mary's Student Government.

St. Mary's Student Government cut their stipend this year to \$900. The SCHOLASTIC could have made up the \$60 depletion.

Last month, the financial committee of Notre Dame's Student Government suggested that the Senate cut the SCHOLASTIC's \$1,000 per semester stipend for the booklet. Academic Commissioner Bill Wilka informed the committee that if their suggestion were approved by the Senate, the cutback would, in effect, make the booklet's printing impossible.

It did.

The SCHOLASTIC staff was in part happy, in part ashamed of their happiness. The booklet was felt to be a service to many members of the community.

The financial committee suggested that the evaluations were compiled by too few students. The evalua-

tions did not represent enough diverse points of view.

We agree that each evaluation is frequently, but unfortunately, done by only one evaluator.

The financial committee suggested that the evaluations are not critical enough. That is, every professor is "the greatest teacher in the University." Consequently, the booklet does not perform an accurate service.

We agree that the booklet has not always been an accurate service.

The financial committee suggested that the booklet serves a small number of students. It is of no use to freshmen or to students in any other college except the College of Arts and Letters.

By a vote of 25 to 13 the Student Senate adopted the financial committee's recommendations.

No teacher-course-evaluation booklet.

The SCHOLASTIC is now in the process of evaluating the evaluation, deciding upon the feasibility and mechanics of the booklet for the spring semester.

We would appreciate any suggestions or criticisms or complaints regarding the teacher-course-evaluation booklet and its re-institution from any member of the community. We apologize for any disappointment or inconvenience caused by a regrettable but unavoidable suspension.

Why Talk About It?

The outrage which followed the *Observer's* and the SCHOLASTIC's placing of an abortion advertisement two weeks ago may or may not have been justified. What is more important, at this point, is that both sides in the argument have thus far managed to ignore the *fact* of abortion and the necessity of talking about the whole issue with openness and charity.

The forum presented in this issue is a first, hesitant step toward recognizing the gravity and complexity of the legal, moral and practical problems involved in the abortion debate.

More important, however, it is an attempt to end what appears to be a negligent silence—or at the very least a reticence to talk about a difficult issue. This community has yet to witness a real public dialogue over the abortion question. We have been content to fulminate righteously and/or remain silent.

Both of which testify only to our own insensitivity.

The first two essays offer criticisms of the impulse behind the movement to liberalize abortion—from legal and moral/ethical stances. Each takes a slightly different perspective, each offers a different emphasis.

The third or composite essay argues for repeal of existing laws concerning abortion, and attempts to counter some of the most pervasive arguments raised by those against repeal.

The fourth brief statement gives the relatively new rationale for abortion as an essential means for preservation of the human species, faced with ecological disaster. The statement is a zero population growth position paper.

Again, neither position is exhaustively presented. And the forum as a whole makes no claim to definitiveness or finality. It is a step toward further discussion, toward understanding. It is an attempt to end the silence that makes that understanding impossible.

Markings

A Place of Light Behind the Bars

Schools are run by bells. A bell rings and class ends. By the time another bell sounds another class begins. But the rule does have an exception (don't they all?), for at least one school exists where the bells are controlled by the students, and not vice-versa. The students must be in their specified place and accounted for before the bell will ring. But this school falls in the "extraordinary" category on other counts as well: it is the education department of the Indiana State Penitentiary in Michigan City, staffed largely by University of Notre Dame students.

It started last year (logically enough) in a class—Professor Robert Vasoli's criminology class. One of the students, Joe Gagliardi, was quick to seize upon an extra-credit project offered in the course, a field trip to the prison followed by a paper describing the situation, problems, and possible solutions. Joe, even a year later, is quite profuse in his descriptions of the six-by-seven-foot cells, the barely staple food ("Enough to make one appreciate the South Dining Hall"), the overall zoo-like conditions of men in cages, all results of an attitude which regards men as animals.

The conditions of the prison were even more vehemently decried a year ago in the paper turned in following the trip to Michigan City. One of the major objections pointed out in the study done by Joe and others who chose the same project concerns living conditions and the prison's treatment of inmates, but of more serious consequences—the deficiency of the prison's educational offerings. The student's objections were brief, concrete, and condemning. Among them were the fact that the men receive no incentive for education, a necessary aspect of an educational system that is purely voluntary.

In fact the men are virtually, if not intentionally, discouraged from attending classes. They do not receive


any sort of credit toward parole for any educational efforts—though parole is understandably the major goal for an inmate and such an incentive would probably provide the greatest motivation for a prisoner to take advantage of educational opportunities. A second important factor is that the men get paid for their various activities, the wage depending upon what type of work they do and ranging anywhere from 20 to 50 cents a day. Day classes preclude any other sort of work and they receive the lowest amount of pay—20 cents.

The third major objection centered on the staff of the prison's educational facilities. There is a very small civilian contingent of non-professional teachers who come in regularly to conduct classes. Their number, however, is so insufficient that they are forced to recruit the services of inmate teachers. The criterion for selecting these inmates demands only that they have more educational experience than the average prisoner. Which sounds fine until one notes that the prison average is less than the eighth-grade level; the result is that many of the inmate teachers actually lack even a high school diploma.

Further, the men are not tested or evaluated in any way; thus, many are passed to higher levels in the prison's classes without having mastered sufficient preparatory skills in the more elementary classes. This situation creates obvious difficulties for a teacher attempting to conduct an English course with a class incapable of reading even early grade-school material.

These and other problems were pin-pointed in the Notre Dame students' evaluations. The prison's inadequacies might have continued after the extra credit was received for the criminology course, but Professor Vasoli refused to let that happen.

Gagliardi was one of those subsequently challenged by him to move to correct some of the problems he had observed, and began immediately to draw up plans for a



supplementary prison educational program. He presented his plan in outline form to the officials of Sing Sing prison near his home in New York. The officials were very enthusiastic and encouraged him to pursue his plan during the year with the Indiana State prison system. The first implementation of the plan came about during the second semester last year and involved weekly tutoring of inmates on a one-to-one basis by a small group of Notre Dame students.

Last year's limited program produced results that greatly encouraged both the student teachers and prison officials. Gagliardi worked on a more extensive program over the summer and presented it to the authorities at Michigan City. They again were enthusiastic, and the program now in effect was born. Twelve Notre Dame students along with one sister from St. Mary's make the 45-mile trip once a week; the group is divided, with voluntary classes offered on two nights.

Classes are small, ranging from seven to twenty students — depending on the class, the teacher and the night. They are offered during recreation time, the only time available. Attendance is thus a fairly reliable indication of the progress of the group; while the numbers remain small, it is significant to note that they grow, adding new faces each week.

Small talk remains a dominant element of any given class. The men, according to Gagliardi, are extremely anxious to learn about what is going on "outside." Their only source of information is the news media, which explains their surprise on getting acquainted with "real college students." This is part of the reason that the two-hour class schedules include several coffee breaks.

The personnel in the group of student teachers comprehend an interesting variety of backgrounds and interests. Last spring Gagliardi approached Sister Mary Margaretta Reppen from Saint Mary's to obtain aid in improving the teachers' educational technique and wound up with an addition to the teaching staff itself. A specialist in phonics, she is the only teacher with full education credentials and works with the men in a refresher reading program.

Gagliardi has taken on the responsibility of working with the inmates who supplement the day teaching staff. Though he is majoring in sociology, he has a minor in education and his course is oriented so that problems that arise in classroom situations are discussed along with possible solutions. He also attempts to touch on modern teaching techniques.

John Foley is a math major and teams with Chuck Dietrick (in aerospace and mechanical engineering) to provide mathematics instruction on several levels. Bill Nagle, an English major, conducts an English course.

The remaining three members of the group are sociology majors. Alex Watt conducts a reading class and Mark Longar teams with Tom Vasoli to conduct a social problems seminar.


Gagliardi recalls some tense moments early in the program when the students had to win the confidence of the inmates and convince them that their motive was simply to help those who wanted to learn.

Student leaders must also become acclimated to the situation, as was evidenced by a remark made by Chuck Dietrick during a discussion of college life. "Compared to the old days at Notre Dame a student nowadays can get away with murder." The inmates found the remark particularly humorous.

Gagliardi and the others are extremely pleased with the fruits of their efforts thus far, but he will be the first to admit difficulties. The group must provide its own transportation for the two 90-mile round trips each week, and although Student Government appropriated \$350 for gas, they frequently fall short. Secondly, there is a severe shortage of books and the only source for new ones is the dusty bookshelves of fellow students. Finally, Gagliardi expresses a serious need for female colleagues, especially to help conduct reading classes.

It is difficult, certainly, to judge the success of this kind of program, for any significant results must, of necessity, be long-range ones. But if the enthusiasm of both students and inmates is any indication, Gagliardi and the authorities at Michigan City have good grounds for optimism.

—Greg Stidham



The Week In Distortion

Tonto Was a Honkie

A survey taken recently at a reservation in New Mexico showed that 10 percent of the Indians thought we should get out of Vietnam, while 90 percent thought we should get out of America.

Two Couturiers?

Neiman-Marcus of Dallas is offering just the thing for all you concerned pessimists. For \$588,247, the buyer is entitled to an updated version of the biblical ark, com-

plete with room for about 150 animals and an international crew including French chef, Swedish masseur, German hair stylist, English valet, French maid, Italian couturier, Park Avenue physician, and, but of course, an English curator-librarian.

For Home Work . . .

A new course on the instruments of guerrilla warfare was offered as an alternate university course at the University of Illinois, Circle Campus, after approval was given by Chancellor Norman A. Parker. The course, taught by Craig Connally, a 26-year-

old teaching assistant, has a dubious future, though, as many groups, including prominent members of the administration, are clamoring for its demise. Connally believes that "every student should have the opportunity to field strip an M-16." Word has it that their final semester project should come off with a real bang (chortle chortle).

Sign and Symbol

If you take Exit 16 on Interstate 89 heading northwest, do not bother to try to get to Purmont; despite the sign, there is no such place. The

sign was made for Purmont, but the exit interchange was built on the town site and the community was demolished.

Guess Who's Almost Coming to Lunch?

Time recently reported (on its "People" page) a close call for This

Nation's Security. Seems that Grace Slick, of Jefferson Airplane fame and a graduate of (believe it) Finch College, was somehow invited to a party given by fellow-Finch Tricia Nixon. She brought along two friends: Abbie Hoffman, and enough acid to levitate the Presidential punch. Sadly, for the story, if not the Nation, none of the three made it past the front door, or the cadre of security guards for that matter.

But, ah, the possibilities!

High Rise Expected?

The passing of the miniskirt won't be all bad. Some experts predict a renewed interest in feminine meteorology as the lads once again gather on the quads to study wind movements — almost a lost art now.

ALL SUMMER LONG THE BASEBALL SEASON HAS ME SO CRAZY I HAVE STOMACH PAINS FROM TENSION.



IN THE FALL I FORGET MY WIFE, KIDS-ALL IVE GOT ON MY MIND IS PRO-FOOTBALL.



WINTER COMES-MY NERVES ARE SHOT-MY JOB SUFFERS-IM NEAR HYS-TERICAL COLLAPSE OVER BASKET-BALL.



BUT YOU KIDS-



ALL YOU'RE INTERESTED IN IS THE WAR.



AND IT NEVER CHANGES.



GOD, HOW I ENVY YOU.



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A Forum on Abortion

One million abortions take place in the United States annually. That, of course, is merely a guess, since most abortions are performed illegally and underground. Other guesses place the number anywhere from 200,00 to 2,000,000, and there are no statistics available yet to indicate how the recent liberalization or repeal of restrictive laws in a few states (i.e., New York) will affect the total number. Approximately one abortion per four live births seems presently to be a fairly accurate ratio. And rejuvenation of the Kinsey researchers' now-dated findings indicate that about one American woman in four will experience abortion by the time she reaches menopause. Yet, at least before the change in the New York law, annually only 10,000 or one out of 100 live births, were legal abortions.

Effected under conditions meeting modern medical standards, termination of pregnancy offers less danger to the physical health of a woman than carrying the pregnancy to full term and giving birth. Yet, because of the conditions imposed by civil law, botched abortions are the leading cause of deaths associated with pregnancy. (In New York the percentage was as high as 50% of deaths associated with pregnancy.) Again, estimates of actual numbers are hard to determine, but a modest guess is 500-1000 invariably ugly deaths per year. Also to be noted in relation to the risks of illegal abortion is the obvious discrimination on the basis of economic class and race. Before New York removed its restrictive laws, 79% of the state's abortion deaths occurred among blacks and Puerto Rican women. Relative statistics probably apply through the other states. A cost range of approximately \$300-\$1000 for an illegal abortion also eliminated abortion as a possibility for poor women unless techniques of self-mutilation are resorted to in desperation.

These facts are all estimates of varying reliability; most of them might be classified "intelligent guesses." They are all quoted from various respect-

able sources in Lucinda Cisler's article on birth control and abortion in the anthology *Sisterhood is Powerful*, edited by Robin Morgan. These facts, and the complex moral and legal questions that surround it, make abortion an immediate and urgent public issue.

To dispel any illusion that abortion is outdated by the general acceptance of contraceptive techniques and the development of the oral contraceptive (Pill), the following realities must be noted:

- Only 20 of the 50 states have no laws limiting the sale of contraceptives. No states have totally free and easy access to contraceptive information and devices.
- Even the drug companies admit a failure rate of from .1 to one percent with the pills. With 6,000,000 women using this form of contraception, that is 6000 failures annually. Not to mention the possibility of side effects from the drug (i.e., cancer, blood clots, and generally wretched health).
- Intra-uterine devices fail 1.5 percent to 3 percent of the time, and may not be used by all women, because bodies reject foreign matter.
- From there, the long line of relatively primitive techniques—diaphragms, condoms, contraception foam, etc—follow with failure rates anywhere from 8-15 percent of the time. Rhythm offers the highest rate of failure, though a guess on that percentage is unobtainable.

The problems that surround the abortion question remain — for some, abstract and philosophical; for others, terribly immediate and undeniable. The price of ignorance, and insensitivity, are tragic for all concerned.

Julian Pleasants

THE research I do with germfree animals and liquid diets has impressed on me the possibility that a very young fetus might be reared outside the womb. The effort would be a demanding one, even after the technique is fully developed, and as far as I know, no one is working directly to develop it. I bring up the technique here because, even if it is never fully developed or used, it puts abortion into a different moral perspective. Within that perspective, I believe a more effective dialog can be carried out between proponents and opponents of abortion, enabling both sides to see more clearly where their moral commitments lie.

If an aborted human fetus could regularly be reared outside the womb whenever someone took the trouble necessary for it, then obviously abortion need not mean the killing of a human fetus, but rather the transfer of its care from a human uterus to a germfree isolator. With that possibility open, if the baby is allowed to die, it is because both mother and society have refused responsibility for its care. What this means to me is that abortion is not a denial of the fetus' right to life, but a denial of its right to be cared for. It may be objected that when a human being is totally dependent on others for its life, then the right to life is synonymous with the right to be cared for. To refuse care is to refuse life. But it is one thing to go out and kill a man who would otherwise exist quite independently of me, and another thing to refuse the burden of caring for someone who will die without that care.

Precedents already exist for the position that a sick man (or his relatives or physician) is not obliged to take extraordinary means to preserve his life. Furthermore the whole American life style, using as it does a disproportionate share of the world's resources, means that we are refusing care to the millions of children in developing countries who will die this year for lack of food that we could provide. Our consciences are finally becoming sensitive about this situation, but they do not provide us with clear-cut moral imperatives. We can be morally decisive about the fact that those malnourished children should not be taken out and shot. But it requires a special moral calculus to decide how much I should give up of my own goods in order to save their lives.

Where does abortion differ from such situations? Partly, at least, in the present fact that only its mother can care for the young fetus. If she refuses, there is no one else who can step in until we have either techniques for fetal transplants into willing foster mothers, or else techniques of artificial rearing. A mother who puts her newborn baby up for adoption is not condemning it to death, but a mother who puts her early fetus out of her womb is now condemning it to death,

even when the technique of abortion does not injure the fetus. Yet her intention is not to destroy the child but to get rid of a burden of care. She would not object if some one else assumed the burden. What she is facing is the same kind of moral question posed above in other situations: how much should she be willing to give up in order to care for and sustain its life? And we face the difficult legal question: how much should society *demand* that she give up in order to care for it?

Parents are considered morally and legally responsible for the care of their children. The children are theirs; the parents brought them into existence. If this obligation exists after the child is born, at a time when the child could be saved if abandoned, it would seem that there is an even stronger obligation during the earlier period when there is no existing substitute for the mother's care. Yet there are psychological reasons, which will come up further on, for the fact that we do not feel the obligation so strongly in the earlier period.

Society has not heretofore considered normal pregnancy too great an obligation, too great a burden to bear in order to keep a human life going. It has considered the burden too great if the pregnancy threatens the mother's life or risks a serious impairment of mental or physical health. On the other hand, society has become increasingly aware of the burden that even a physiologically normal pregnancy can be, when it occurs in the midst of abnormal social, psychological, or economic pressures.

Yet society faces a real test of sincerity when it cannot or will not lighten those abnormal pressures, cannot or will not assume the burden of artificial care for the fetus, cannot or will not assume the burden of caring for the child after birth, especially if it is handicapped. Should it demand more of a mother than it is willing to do itself? That is the legal problem to which society must address itself. But whatever society decides, the mother and her moral advisers must still face the moral question: what should this mother be willing to bear to meet her child's right to be cared for?

Here we realize that there is more to the calculus than the objective physiological or economic burden of pregnancy. A mother is willing to bear very heavy burdens for the child she has borne and nursed and known as an individual. Apart from moral considerations, it is often easier to bear the burden than to suffer the emotional wrenching that accompanies giving up the burden. Thus child abandonment after the mother has known her child is a rather rare exception. But fetal abandonment, which is what I am calling abortion, faces much less psychological resistance than child abandonment. There are much weaker bonds to break, much weaker inhibitions to overcome. She can find even a light burden difficult to bear if there is little emotional cost in getting rid of it.

THESE are insights into this situation which we can get from modern biological theories about human aggressiveness. Almost alone among animals, man carries his aggressive actions beyond ritual to actual killing. The mass killing we call war is man's own special achievement. For some students of animal and human aggression, especially Konrad Lorenz, man has not lost the inhibitions that keep him from killing a fellow man. What has happened is that man invented weapons that would kill quickly or at a distance, so that the weaker party never got a chance to make gestures that would symbolize submission and inhibit further aggression by his opponent.

Modern war has carried the remoteness one step farther. Between the men who choose to make war and their opponents who suffer it, there now lies a professional army as well as the weapons. Small wonder that emotional revulsion gets little chance to reinforce the moral revulsion which wishes to bring an unjust war to an end. A like situation exists in the case of abortion, which is a kind of war not only against one's own species, but against one's own children.

Even if there were not this analogy, it would obviously be less easy to identify with the humanness of a developing fetus than with that of a newborn infant. This kind of difficulty is nothing new. In times past, people have failed to recognize the humanness of adults whose skins were a different color, or whose speech seemed unintelligible to them. There is an even greater divergence between the fetus and the newborn. But beyond this difficulty, it happens in abortion as it does in war, that instrumentation and professionalism have removed the operation outside the realm in which human feelings can operate. The mother who chooses the operation does not carry it out or see it carried out. She is anesthetized in the fullest sense of the word. It is doctors and nurses who see and hear the consequences of the operation, and even they may be protected by their instruments from seeing what they do.

Proponents of abortion have even called it dirty politics to talk about the dismembered bodies, the gasps and whimpers of a late-aborted fetus as it faces the inhospitable environment of the hospital. Is it dirty politics to show what napalm and anti-personnel bombs have done to children in Vietnam? The preservation of human life is too important to be treated unemotionally. Human feelings have proved to be necessary reinforcers of moral prohibitions against the killing of fellowmen. If we are going to weigh against one another the mother's burden and the baby's death, we must be as emotionally attuned to one as to the other. Abortion seems a wonderfully final and easy way out of many threatening problems. If we look only at the problems it solves, and not at the problem it is, we risk falling into that anesthetic state which modern

instrumentation brings about — the turning off of human contact and human response. In an earlier article, I drew the following parallel (*The Religious Situation* 1969, pp. 343-4.):

The bombardier about to loose his bombs on a Vietnamese village may be able to see figures scurrying about below, but they are so tiny and shapeless that he cannot see them as human beings, though he may have indirect reasons to think so. He would rather not kill them, but they could be a threat to a way of life; they are or could be troublemakers. Besides, their lives seem so primitive and unimportant. It takes only the touch of a button to eliminate them and he won't even see it happen. What chance is there for instinctive inhibitions to operate either in aerial warfare or in abortion? The hostility hitherto reserved for our enemies can now be visited on our own children, who seem as much a threat to the quality of our lives as does the outside agitator who demands a share of what we have.

Yet those moralists who have seen abortion as intrinsically and absolutely evil, not even permitted to save the mother's life, have had to shut themselves off just as thoroughly from sharing the feelings of the mother trapped in poverty, ill health, and an already too large family. We are not dealing here with a conflict of rights in which we have to decide whose rights will prevail. The consideration of abortion does not call in question the child's right to life; it asks how much a person must sacrifice to care for another's life. No moralists that I know have given a clear-cut answer to that question.

As long as men are dying of hunger in the world, and I have not stripped myself and my family to a bare subsistence, am I guilty of their death? If a woman is driven to abortion by poverty, and a man has not met her financial needs, is it she or he who is responsible for the loss of human life? We have not faced these problems with regard to abortion because we have not been willing to face them in analogous situations in which we are already implicated. When we do face them, we do not reach the absolutist conclusions that some moralists have reached against abortion. Is it only of mothers that we make the absolute demands?

IT may seem that while condemning abortion, I have left a loophole for it when the mother finds the burden too much to bear. The mother is not denying the child right to life; she is saying that her obligation to care for it ceases when the burden becomes too great. I am not in favor of laws which would force a woman to carry a burden she considers intolerable, nor in favor of that

totally unlikely law which would strip us all of most of our wealth to save the hungry of the world. These are moral questions for which no clear-cut answers, let alone consensus, yet exist.

But in the arguments for abortion, I do see a frightening reversal of what has been a trend toward meeting others' needs, even at a personal sacrifice. We have taxed ourselves to meet the needs of the poor and hungry, both here and abroad. We have taxed ourselves to meet the needs of the weak, the ill, the mentally retarded. We have gone beyond seeing our moral obligations in terms of not stealing, not shooting, not lying. Some students in a seminar on violence in America made a startling extension of the usual concept. They said: "Violence is not giving people what they need." We have gradually been coming to see that this is so, and it is a remarkable odyssey. Are we to reverse this trend by denying the unborn child's right to care because that care is burdensome?

There are those who say that the population explosion demands such a reversal, that it is time to stop caring for the individual life and start caring for the race as a whole. I think that moralists in general have not realized that this attitude can mark a complete revolution in morality. It can turn morality literally upside down. The old moral consensus, even after it lost its religious underpinnings, could still be epitomized in John Donne's famous line: "Any man's death diminishes me, for I am a part of mankind;" — hence our idealization, if not our imitation of those who reverence life, who give of themselves for the sick, the old, the young, the weak, the mentally retarded or mentally ill. But the modern prophet of population catastrophe would turn Donne entirely around: "Any man's *birth* diminishes me — diminishes my share of the world's limited resources, diminishes my space and freedom." Donne is thereby undone, and what he exalted as virtue in the service of individual life becomes an attack on the quality of collective life.

The reversal of morality can be expressed in another way. We could once get a humanist basis for a liberal morality on the grounds that no man's life is safe unless everybody's life is safe. The ecological prophet turns it completely around: no man's life is safe if everybody's life is safe. The threat of an overpopulated world calls in question the whole momentum built up for extending full protection to the lives of more and more kinds of people: racial and religious minorities, the mentally and culturally disadvantaged, the poor, the old, the weak. Paradoxically, however, the goal of the population prophet is not to turn morality upside down in order to prevent overpopulation, but to prevent overpopulation from turning morality upside down. If his warning is heeded, the world can stave off population pressures which would cheapen human life.

We face, then, a strange dilemma in some areas. If abortion were not so extensively practiced, e.g., in Latin America, many areas would face population pressures which would cheapen human life in general. Yet abortion itself is cheapening human life, not only the life of the unborn child, but in those areas, the life of the mother, who runs serious risks herself. The only solution may be yet another paradox, that the way to control population is to get more food to people, to save the children who now die from malnutrition. Obviously this would cause an immediate spurt in population growth. But a prime reason why people have been refusing contraception in developing countries is that they have to have many children in order to be sure that a few children will survive to care for them in their old age. If people could get the benefit of means already available for increasing food production, and could see their children nearly all surviving to maturity, they could be prepared for the practice of family limitation.

To close on a series of paradoxes seems the most appropriate way to express my position, many facets of which I have had to leave out entirely. It is surprising how long we had to wait for comprehensive studies of abortion, considering the fact that millions of fetal lives, and many thousands of maternal lives are lost each year through abortion, while at the same time many social, economic and psychological problems are circumvented through abortion. Volumes are now being written on the subject, yet even their authors, such as Daniel Callahan, have difficulty reaching conclusions.

My own paradox is that I consider the liberalization of abortion laws as a step forward in our understanding of what society can and cannot demand, while I consider much of the advocacy of abortion as a giant step backward, a willingness to let unborn individuals pay with their lives for our refusal to solve the social and economic problems that lie behind the demand for abortion.

My own paradoxical conclusion is that increasing concern and respect and care for each individual life is the only way we can build up the quality of our collective life and save it from the threats imposed by overpopulation. I do not believe that villages or fetuses should be destroyed in order to save them, or that they have to be destroyed in order to save us.

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Protection under
the law:

where should
the fetus stand?

Rudolph Gerber

BABIES," remarked Mrs. Jill Knight, a Conservative, Protestant Member of Parliament during a debate in the House of Commons in 1966, "are not like bad teeth to be jerked out just because they cause suffering. An unborn baby is a baby nevertheless."

"There ought to be no special laws regulating abortion," wrote psychiatrist Dr. Thomas S. Szasz in the same year. "Such an operation should be available in the same way as, say, an operation for the beautification of a nose: the only requirement ought to be the woman's desire to have the operation, her consent, and the willingness of a physician to perform the procedure." ("The Ethics of Abortion," *Humanist*, Vol. 732, No. 60, July 22, 1966. Szasz is throughout quoted from here)

Such dialectics mark the two issues central in the abortion debate now before the Supreme Court and, indeed, before the entire nation. One view sees the unborn child possessing inviolable rights, including the right to life, from the moment life begins. The other view sees the unborn child as something less than human, nothing more than—in Dr. Szasz's terminology—"a part of the mother's body," therefore possessing rights necessarily subordinate to the convenience of its parents and society at large.

This debate has centered on a practical legal question: should existing laws on abortion be relaxed to make abortions easier to obtain? Dr. Szasz has stated his answer clearly: "If abortion is murder . . . , it is an immoral act which the law must prohibit." On the other hand, if abortion is not murder, if it is nothing more serious than any other medical procedure, there is no reason why it should concern the law at all. In that case, "the proper remedy must be sought not in medically and psychiatrically 'liberal' abortion laws, but in the repeal of all such laws (Szasz)." Obviously, the law should not tolerate even a small amount of murder; but, by the same token, neither should the law take any notice of the mere removal of a blob of non-human tissue from the womb.

The central issue of having or not having a law on

abortion is still wide open. Yet it is worth observing that the moral aspirations of law are minimal. Law seeks to establish and maintain only that minimum of actualized morality necessary for the healthy functioning of the social order. It enforces only what is minimally acceptable, and in this sense socially necessary. Mindful of its nature, the law is perennially required to be tolerant of many evils that morality condemns. The question remains: is there any social necessity that the law adopt and protect a minimal standard of what constitutes humanity?

Contemporary attitudes on the taking of human life are organic growths of two fundamentally different legal mentalities, the Hellenistic-medieval, epitomized by Thomas Aquinas, and the modern, epitomized by Roscoe Pound. In the abortion debate, it is not merely two ethics facing each other, but the world views of two epochs, two cultures—one traditional and dated, the other new and untested. Modern Western man has become increasingly preoccupied, even obsessed, with his interpersonal, secular experience, brooding over it, attempting to read it to understand what and who he is vis-a-vis his peers. He has come to suspect any speculative thesis about man that cannot be verified inductively in his own experience.

The concentration on this-worldly experience, in abstraction from metaphysical sensitivities, inevitably forges new ethical patterns rooted largely in the sciences. Nature is no longer a finished vessel, whose given nature one must respect. Nature is now clay to be broken and remolded responsibly and creatively, to one's Faustian desire. Examples of new moral sensitivity illustrate the cyclopean view of modern man: his resolute focusing on interpersonal experience, his refusal to look to *a priori* considerations to downstage that experience, and his consequent sense of responsibility for making and remaking the pattern of interpersonal relations.

Accordingly, while the modern mind reacts strongly to the experience of persons going knowingly to death in war or in death row, it sees no comparison between a fetus for which there is no overt sign of "human" experience and a baby already experientially developing its personality in reaction to the persons around it.

There is, without doubt, a problem of "drawing the line" exactly where human self-creating begins. The contemporary mind neglects the problem and will be forced to face it anew someday. But to say there is a problem of drawing the exact line is not to say that there is a problem of indicating times when humanity is evidently on one side of the line or the other. The same problem is faced by both the classical and the modern mentality in determining when a human person becomes a corpse, especially in transplanting organs before it is too late.

THE basic modern argument for abortion eventually relies on the notion that humanity, far from being a "given," is an "achievement" resulting from social relationships. This thesis asserts as a fundamental principle that human rights are "social," i.e., they derive from social intercourse, not from *a priori* conditions either logically or chronologically precedent to social intercourse. Such a view seems near the center of the abortion reform movement. In a letter to the New York *Times* of March 9, 1967, Ashley Montagu contended that

The embryo, fetus, and newborn of the human species, in point of fact, do not really become functionally human until humanized in the human socialization process.

Humanity is an achievement, not an endowment. The potentialities constitute the endowment, their fulfillment requires a humanizing environment.

Rare examples of feral man ("wolf children") would tend to give this argument a certain anthropological support seemingly not diminished by pedestrian hermits, recluses, spinsters, or wall flowers. But what that "socialization" argument does indeed suggest is precisely the difficulty with a haunting by-product of the abortion movement: humanity has now been subtly redefined in terms of degrees of achieved social involvement.

The argument that social importance or "value" or "interaction" constitutes protected degrees of humanity offers no threat to the Nixons, Johnsons, Lawlesses, Rices, Gerbers — or Hitlers — of this world. They all

can point to their social involvements to assert their claim to a humanity supposedly engendered by those involvements. Such involvement is no help to the unborn fetus, however, who has yet to meet his mother, or to the aged and senile grandmother who will never again recognize a person. Neither, logic adds, is that argument much help to the Helen Kellers and Ludwig Beethovens and Friedrich Nietzsches whose physical disabilities retard their social interactions and consequently diminish their social importance.

Apart from the question of law and the definition of humanity, the abortion movement appears as a species of mass momentum which no delicate moral or legal arguments can halt. The silent majority has long had a way of ignoring moral and philosophical subtleties whose refinements threaten its innate inertia. An age heir to the tradition of Social Darwinism will fare no better in this regard than the pre-Darwinian era of revolutionary France, Elizabethan England, or Nero's Rome regarding the masses' attitudes toward corporal punishment, child labor, or slavery. The morality of the masses has always been the convenience of the moment. Its only remedy has been via the disasters of revolution, violence, and immoral wars which seemingly constitute man's harshest but surest — and saddest — correctives.

THAT the important arguments on the abortion issue involve the status not of the mother, but of the humanity of the fetus is not difficult to realize. Nor is it any more difficult to acknowledge that the fetus has the traditional moral, philosophical, legal, and biological arguments in his favor. He is not any more "inferior" than an infant in his mother's arms or a child in grade school is inferior compared to adult humanity. If he is "immature," so also is his elder brother of one year and his elder sister of six years. If he is considered "rudimentary" or "inchoate," so also are all born infants who need food and care and protection to reach adulthood. If dependence from motherly care justifies abortion, it would also justify infanticide, as well as deaths of those unfortunate cripples and chronics who depend on a mother or a nurse for survival.

(In *Gleitmen v. Cosgrove*, the New Jersey Supreme

Court declared: "It is basic to the human condition to seek life and to hold onto it however heavily burdened. If Jeffrey [the deformed child, whose parents brought suit] could have been asked as to whether his life should be snuffed out before his full term of gestation could run its course, our felt intuition of human nature tells us that he would almost surely choose life with defects as against no life at all.")

Such *reductiones ad absurdum* are no longer an absurdity. An age obsessed with overpopulation, congestion, and pollution recognizes no other absurdities than those which stalk the land of the born. Humans who are unborn cannot be counted. They do not speak up, so they cannot appear on the sociological scales of our now-divinized public opinion. Yet the polls measure the *is*, not the *ought*. They record loud protests for civil rights but not the silent testimony of human rights. On the scales of vocal protest, it is the anguished woman rather than her unborn child who speaks loudest of injustice and inhumanity in the abortion laws. The possible humanity of the fetus is often too speculative an affair for many who pronounce with papal conviction on the immorality of war, the rights of C.O., the inhumanity of capital punishment, the slaughter of innocent babes-in-arms at My Lai. Yet to decide humanity by a given society's piecemeal sentiment for external signs has led to results whose awkward logic only history can dispel. Montesquieu once observed that there could be no human soul in the majestically passive peoples of black skin in Africa, saying "Il est si naturel de penser que c'est la couleur qui constitue l'essence de l'humanité que les peuples d'Arie, quit font des eunuques, privent toujours les noirs du rapport qu'ils ont avec nous d'une façon plus marquée." (De l'esprit de lois, 1843)

Objectively, the humanity of the incipient fetus seems well verified by studies of species — specific DNA and by the philosophical observation that its potentialities, even at the genetic level, are human from the start. If humanity is not valued at its origins, it is difficult to value it in its growth or flowering: a weed left to survive is not thereby nobler than a weed uprooted. In principle, the human fetus would seem to deserve at least as much protection as Sierra Clubs and Humane Societies devote to whooping cranes, Canadian seal pups, and Florida alligators.

The real effect of the abortion laws as they seem certain to appear in five years is not so much the loss of the life of the unborn but the diminution of value and divinity in the socially deprived among the born—of the infant of six months, of the spastic teenager, of the adult living in an iron lung, of the aged woman in a wheelchair, of the lunatic in an asylum, of the recluse, the hermit—and one is tempted to add, the scholar, the thinker. On the scales of social intercourse, the humanity of each of these individuals either never registers or registers only at inferior levels. If a little experience mixed with a little logic goes a long way, it seems likely that the practical as well as the logical distinctions will shortly disappear among abortion, infanticide, and the various sociological conveniences called "mercy killing"—to the detriment of the *extra*—as well as of the *intra*-uterine world. Once again, the English experience might become American precedent: those who pushed for a liberalized abortion law in Britain three years ago are now pushing for an Euthanasia bill defeated in the House of Lords by only 61 to 40 last year. The entire experience might serve as a reminder that there is no such stage as "just a little bit human," any more than being "just a little bit pregnant" or "a little more equal." The quantitative differentiations of the yardstick, the scales, the Gallup Polls are close cousins to a functional and technological assessment of humanity, the entirety of which may constitute a sociological disposal system smoother and more antiseptic than ever devised by any tyrant or Führer.

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Helen Williams,
Carol Taylor
& Carolyn Gatz

GIVEN that it requires a much more extensive defense to support a position foreign to conventional sensibilities than is necessary to defend positions congruent with tradition, the demand for abortion law repeal must cover much more ground—offensively and defensively—than defense of the present norm. In other words, it takes more energy to change the direction of a rock rolling down a steep incline than it takes to allow the rock to roll on its way unobstructed. That is obvious.

The position paper arguing for abortion law repeal must, then, deal with a myriad of arguments, some based on the most deep-rooted cultural concepts held by modern man. Any quixotic lunges attempting to present new views on these subjects—abortion being one—must be understood as limited or incomplete. Which does not imply that abortion does not have a long tradition and history of its own. Its history is probably as long as the history of pregnancy, which is pretty long.

Recently a rather large, burly and pseudo-sympathetic gentleman lamented the identification of the “legitimate” demands for equal pay and elimination of job discrimination made by women’s rights advocates with the “immoral” demand for easy access to abortion. His belief in that kind of separation between the two movements bespeaks a deeply rooted cultural concept: even in an extremely egalitarian situation, a woman’s body is defined by her biological capacity. That capacity remains the primary definition of her person, with all needs of the person (except for physical survival), subjected to her “biological destiny.” If an adult human being does not have the right to control his/her body—if his/her will may be taken over without consent by another organism (however sacred and beautiful that organism may be)—then what rights does she have?

That a conflict of basic human rights between the woman and the foetus may exist to an extremity that calls for undertaking the responsibility for the foetus’s death seems obvious. If this were not true, how would one explain the high incidence of extreme risk-taking to obtain illegitimate abortions, or the desperate self-mutilation by pregnant women that goes on in this and other countries?

Anyone who does not recognize the unique interpersonal relationship between a woman and the foetus that she carries must be a male. A non-viable foetus is in the role of parasite, in the denotative sense of that word. That is simple statement of biological fact. That it is also possible—give combinations and complexes of

internal and external situations and forces—for the foetus to fall into the role indicated by the connotative meanings of that word is again indicated by the number of women taking grave risks to thwart continuation of a pregnancy.

Yet this realization is what legislators in both the civil and religious realms have consistently refused to admit. In the face of human suffering that daily reaches proportions driving women to risk death for abortion, men vested with power to relieve that suffering—or at least admit of a dilemma—have majorally answered the situation with platitudes suggesting that one be “humble before life.” Reality is denied here somewhere. Basic human rights of the mother are denied here somewhere.

Recognizing this situation, it seems obvious that the only person finally capable of weighing the factors involved in a decision about an unwanted pregnancy is the woman. This is especially visible in the inadequacy of reform laws. The criteria for “justified” abortion are impossible to formulate. The result of attempts to do so with reform laws has generally brought no decrease in the illegal abortion market and a maze of humiliating and costly procedures thrown up before a woman daring to seek legal abortion. (This sketch of the situation, inadequate as it is, is derived from various accounts by women who have attempted to hurtle the bureaucratic barricades.)

The demand for recognition of a woman’s right to control the uses to which her body is subjected is an essential point for the Women’s Movement in this country. The discussion that follows is derived from the perceptions shared by women in the Women’s Liberation Movement. It is not a Movement position paper, however. It is a formulation of personal understandings of the issues involved. It is an attempt to persuade away from the monolithic reaction society often gives in answer to the need for safe and inexpensive abortion.

As far as the eye can see, no one who calls for elimination of restrictions on abortion does so viewing the surgical operation as “merely another means of contraception.” Termination of a pregnancy remains a more weighty undertaking than prevention of pregnancy. More weighty on several levels—psychologically, physically, emotionally—though none of these may really be separated. Successful contraception is always the preferable option; the problem is that in a technological age capable of outrageous “progress,” no safe, effective means of contraception exists.

There remains, however, a parable to relate as foundation for the discussion to follow. The point will be reiterated, but as a first and fundamental complaint, the following story deserves re-telling, particularly in a discussion of abortion at the University of Notre Dame.

A doctor whose name is lost in the shade of memory spoke on abortion here two years ago. He told this story:

In virtually all anthropological data from cultures about which we know sufficient amounts to reconstruct social norms, archaeological findings have included instruments relative to and obviously used for the same purposes as modern surgical instruments for abortion. Because of the structures of society in most of these cultures — which included segregation of women from men for large proportions of their activities — and because of the taboos surrounding women's bodies, women handled all matters related to birth within their closed society. Women had babies. Women didn't have babies. One would suppose they did this with some reason behind the acts of birth and prevention of birth.

This tradition proceeded until men — for whatever reason, although some say that the transition coincided with the beginnings of private property — realized that the independent situation of women's control over birth was a power they held over men. Usurpation of that power became the next order of business. Thus, over long periods of time, the midwife disappeared, to be replaced by male doctors, and the great on-going legal, philosophical, theological arguments about inheritance, legitimacy, contraception and abortion began. They continue to this day, with female voices rarely heard in the power-holding halls of debate.

Noting one woman in a panel of five persons at the one public discussion of abortion on campus this semester, one would suppose the parable might offer some insight into the "problem" of abortion.

ABORTION elicits views from two perspectives. One of these regards the act as a personal one subject to moral consideration as any act is. The second views abortion in terms of real or possible public policy (policy being a set of goals and machinery established to achieve these goals). Public policy is not inherently subject to the same pressures to meet moral requirements as private activity. Z.P. G. treats abortion in light of the latter formulation. The following treats abortion as primarily the former. The defense of abortion may proceed from a number of different premises, some of which raise "logical" doubts about the perniciousness of abortion, while others appear to arise from an assertion of rights barely perceivable to the immediate culture. The defense resolves into two requirements for change in the contemporary treatment of abortion: the establishment of the decision as one to be made by the mother and not to be interfered with by public sanctions; and a more accurate view of the nature of abortion as an action and how it is to be dealt with as private morality.

Legal sanctions against abortion have arisen from two sources: the belief that abortion constitutes private and social immorality of such magnitude that society has the right to punish it as a crime (though, oddly, it is not the mother who is prosecuted but the doctor); and, whether or not one wishes to acknowledge such a prac-

tical judgment on so sober a matter, the belief that a large and increasing population was good economic and political policy. The education of individuals to believe that abortion violates private standards of moral behavior derives from an assumption of absolute equality between a developing organism and an independently existing organism. The belief that the hosting of a developing organism is so much the purpose of a woman's organs that their use for that purpose may therefore be removed from the decision-making process employed in every other life activity and that is, incidentally, the core of moral choice, is the concept underlying such an equation.

The establishment of the public and private acceptability of abortion as an alternative to pregnancy requires breaking the assumption of absolute immorality in the act. It is not necessary to support abortion as a positive good; one would not urge that women become pregnant in order to have an abortion, or to save up for it in their old age, or that the more abortions they have the better people they become. One must, however, support abortion as a personal and social option that must remain open to individuals without direct or indirect reprisal.

Morals are formulated and interpreted by the institutions that enforce them. Morality is essentially a complex of taboos through which a society internalizes its value systems and provides the structures it deems necessary to its welfare. The society then acts to procure usually voluntary compliance with those established norms. Even when the source claimed for a moral prohibition or injunction is divine, it is society that acts as an intermediary to define and interpret the particulars of moral law.

Despite the belief that certain philosophies are based on a somehow timeless view of the world, what is more at issue is consciousness of one's unavoidable immersion in an experience and a certain honesty in admitting this rather than hiding behind "objectivity." Objectivity is a euphemism for the opinions of those whose relationship to a given issue is relatively remote, but who nevertheless wish to claim rights to decision-making on that issue. Thus, with regard to abortion, the greater familiarity of women with all aspects of the issue, from the physical operation to the moral dilemmas, must be given a certain primacy. Men, whose sensitivity to the needs of others is not noticeably greater than that of women must relinquish their claim to be somehow more sensitive to the fetus and its rights than women. What is most significant in predominantly male control of both the legal and moral machinery involved in enforcing prohibition against abortion is the obvious power relationship between men and women that sanctions decision-making by men on matters affecting women much more closely than men.

That male norms are often ensconced as society's norms reflects the ability of one group to make itself appear as the whole, often even to those who are hurt

most by that deception. In a very real challenge, then, one must assert that, whatever its pretenses, all theology and philosophy (and the norms for society that are derived from them) must be seen as arising out of the perceptions and experiences of those who articulate them. As such, they too are particular rather than universal in nature, and until there is a theology and philosophy that is derived as much from women's experience as men's, the moral question must remain in abeyance. Of particular importance in this line is the consistent refusal of most moral discussants to consider the rights of women and the possibility of a conflict of human rights between the mother and the fetus or even to consider women as human beings in the same way that men are human beings.

It is a given for men that it is sufficient for their bodies' existence that the body function to sustain their own life (because they can't do anything else). But that women should likewise consider it sufficient good for their bodies to sustain their individual lives and that consequently pregnancy is a separate activity to which a woman may or may not decide to give over her body, seems strange. The separation of sex and reproduction is in one way an accomplished fact for men. That women should seek such a separation as their right is denounced. The fact is accomplished for men by a biological arrangement in which women bear pregnancy (note: women do not reproduce by themselves, they only bear pregnancy by themselves) and reinforced by a sociological arrangement after birth in which women undertake primary responsibility for the care of the child. In another way, sex and reproduction are simultaneous for men in that ejaculation carries both sexual release and the male contribution to reproduction.

If men were serious about the separation of sex and reproduction, they would seek to regulate their own contribution to reproduction. In the present state of affairs, vasectomy is the only method that approximates the effectiveness of the pill for female use. In the absence of such regulation, men must then admit that what has been separated for them is sex and the responsibility for results of the reproductive act. What follows, then, is the question of whether or not women must accept that responsibility under all conditions, or under any conditions determined by someone other than themselves. Women have the right to control their own bodies and they must be able to actualize that right. Forced pregnancy is as unacceptable as forced abortion. The decision to become or remain pregnant is a decision separable from the decision to exercise the right to sexual expression.

A PART, however, from what may be termed the "politics" of male-female relationships—which determine who is to make what decisions and how—a central question remains. What kind of act is abortion? How would one view it who had only oneself to account

to? The major argument against abortion is a pretty straightforward one: that it constitutes a form of murder. Murder, oddly enough, is not an easily defined thing. There is first-degree second-degree, even third-degree murder, manslaughter, justifiable homicide and other shades of differentiation among essentially the same acts. There is euthenasia and the argument wheeling around that concept. There is abortion. The word "murder" in connection with abortion, is used somewhat inconsistently. Most often, "murder" means the destruction of independent human life; in speaking of abortion, it appears to mean the denial of the potential for human life.

One need hardly mention that distinctions are made between different cases of destruction of independent human life on an even grander scale than those enumerated above. When societies decide that such destruction is undertaken against others outside the primary group to defend the rights of that society or its good (or goods), it is called war. Then participation is enjoined upon the members of the society rather than prohibited. When the destruction of independent human life is achieved through diffuse means, such as starvation and disease within the capacity of man to prevent, it is termed "nature" or "economic necessity," none of which are attributable to moral responsibility. When one speaks more specifically of the conflict of rights of the living and of the unborn, the choice is often one of limiting the development of an organism that will eventually produce human life or depriving an already existing independent life of the means of survival.

The conclusion is inescapable that destruction of independent human life is not at all times and in all ways murder in society's eyes; that is, that there is an accepted moral supposition that an immediate and concrete act derives its content in part from the context in which it takes place.

FURTHER, it is by no means clear that an organism that will eventually produce human life is in itself human. There are stages of development during which one refers to expulsion of the organism from the womb even spontaneously as abortion rather than birth; on the other hand, from at least seven months of pregnancy, expulsion before term resulting even from induced labor is premature birth rather than abortion. The key to these working medical definitions lies in the ability of the organism at its stages of development to begin independent life outside the womb.

Early Christianity held relatively consistently that abortion did not constitute murder if the fetus was not "animated." "Animation" marked the beginning of specifically human life in the womb. The belief of ancient Greeks continued into Christianity (notably in St. Thomas Aquinas) that infusion of the soul for a male child occurred 40 days after conception and 80 or 90 days after for a female. The debate continued until

1869 when Pope Pius IX dismissed the distinction between a non-animated and animated foetus and defined all abortions as murder, in violation of the natural law of God. Thus, the certainty that abortion is murder, like the certainty of papal infallibility, is little more than a century old. Current biological research is hardly the first to indicate, then, that the early stages of foetal development do not constitute human life as we know it *per se*.

Apart from the controversy over whether human life exists at all before the beginning of the socialization process (which cannot take place at all before birth), the question of what constitutes human life biologically may be taken up. That human life begins at conception is an arbitrary decision. The only substantiation is the presence of a full genetic code in the egg and spermatozoa joined. Removal of this conceptus as a medical practice in the Far East is not even considered abortion, and in the West reproduction physiologists would not consider life to have begun until the conceptus is implanted in the uterine wall.

From the time of implantation and interaction with the uterine environment, to about the eighth week of pregnancy, the embryo resembles the embryos of other mammalian species so closely that they cannot be differentiated except by a trained embryologist. Up to at least twenty-one weeks of gestation, the foetus, though increasingly differentiated is "non-viable" or unable to maintain life outside the womb. If the question on abortion is, as it is in other "kinds" of murder, one of the destruction of independent human life, the removal of a foetus from the womb can hardly qualify. Abortion simply is not identical with murder.

If one wishes to condemn abortion on the more extended grounds of denying the potential for human life, one must also say the same for the use of any contraceptive. Any contraceptive, including abstinence. The egg and the sperm have the potential, even when separate, for human life. In strict logic, keeping them apart is a denial of that potential.

The procreative injunction could then apply to all persons at all times. Obviously no group, notably the Western churches, has followed that line of logic, at least so far, and it need not be pursued here except that the reason concern for potential humanness draws the line where it does is interesting. It becomes obvious that the requirement that conception continue into a full-term pregnancy was intended as a control on the act that produced conception, sexual intercourse. Maintenance of the family was the primary goal, not primarily as a network of intimate relationships, but as a unit defining which adults will be responsible for which children and as a unit of survival responsibilities thereby relieving society as a whole from shared responsibility for all its members. Controls on illegitimate birth, notably social stigma and/or ostracism and economic hardships, are intended to reenforce that goal.

A FINAL note may be in order on the real state of practical morality with regard to abortion. It is first of all obvious that this is a time of prohibition, and that like the era of prohibition against alcohol, statutory regulation does not work. People are not convinced of its legitimacy. The result is that one group of people have achieved control of the machinery to punish other people who do not agree with them. They do this by causing women who seek an "illegal" abortion to undergo incredible indignities and suffering. It is also apparent that of the three acts involved in the abortion issue — sexual intercourse, abortion itself, and live birth — full-term pregnancy and live birth outside marriage is the most heavily punished. How many institutions regularly punish women who choose to continue a pregnancy while "single" but, rightly, expect life to continue normally for women who have abortions? This apparent anomaly only makes clearer the original purpose of opposing abortion: to achieve a measure of social control. In a time like our own, when it becomes apparent that opposing abortion will no longer achieve that goal of social restraint, a good guess is that even the most morally conservative voices will begin to treat abortion in more neutral terms. It is a second good guess that these voices will then seek to maintain social controls by maintaining the "shame" and economic difficulties of unwed parenthood. This hypocrisy can hardly be considered an advance. The case for treating abortion as a morally neutral act is on much sounder biological and philosophical ground than such hypocritical practicality would indicate. And the right of women to control their own bodies, to seek an abortion in or out of wedlock, to bear children in or out of wedlock, without sanction from the outside, must be maintained.

Helen Williams, Carol Taylor and Carolyn Gatz prefaced the actual writing of the pro-repeal article with a lengthy discussion of the ground to be covered and the major arguments to be pursued. The writing was then divided: the first section done by Carolyn Gatz and the latter by Helen Williams.

Helen Williams is a former member of the faculty of Indiana University, South Bend extension, where she taught in the history department. Since leaving that faculty, she has taken major responsibility for the establishment of a free communal day care center in the Unitarian Church and performed pseudo-conventional housewifely tasks. Her husband, John, teaches in the Notre Dame history department.

Carol Taylor is on the Speech Department faculty of IUSB.

Carolyn Gatz is a senior at St. Mary's College, and a senior editor of the SCHOLASTIC.

All three women are active members of the South Bend Women's Liberation Caucus.

Elizabeth Poulson

ZERO Population Growth is a national organization, with a campus chapter, that believes that the population explosion is the underlying cause of many of our economic, social and environmental crises even in the United States. We maintain that stabilization of population size is essential if mankind is to survive. To stabilize the population, the number of babies born must be equal to the number of people who die. In other words the rate of growth must be zero. A stable population will be reached if a family has only two children. We advocate that limiting the size of the family should be done now on a voluntary basis, and that every method must be made available before the problem gets so serious that the government determines to use coercive measures to halt population growth. Abortion is one method for controlling family size and it, along with contraception and not in place of it, must be made readily available for those who wish it.

At present the world's population is increasing at a rate of two per cent a year. Our numbers will double in 35 years. Because the world's resources are finite and man is a biological entity, this population increase cannot continue indefinitely. There is not enough food for everyone now. Every day 10,000 die because of starvation, and even if we were able to distribute surplus food, it would only mean about one-half a cup of rice more per person once or twice a week. Hardly enough to maintain life. Even the so-called green revolution with miracle grains will only buy time to solve the population problem, according to Norman Borlaug, the man who just received the Nobel Peace prize for developing a miracle wheat. In spite of such advances there will be a little less of everything for those already here every time the population is increased by one. Thus, it is only in countries of relative affluence that foetal rights can be thought to have precedence over those of others.

Even in the United States, where conditions generally are not as severe as in the rest of the world, women seek abortions. In spite of the laws that permit abortion only to save the life of the mother, many, many women do have abortions. They do so because contraceptive methods are not perfect. The vast majority of abortions performed are illegal ones which subject women to "medical" practices unacceptable in any other circumstance. If they are lucky, the women suffer no ill effects; if they are unlucky, they die. Women have had and will continue to have abortions; they should certainly not be denied twentieth-century


medicine. Abortion is a medical matter and should not be a legal issue. The decision to have an abortion should be made between the patient and her doctor.

In recent years there has been growing support for reform of existing abortion laws. The reforms have generally been along the lines proposed by the American Law Institute whereby abortions would be permitted if the pregnancy would gravely impair the physical or mental health of the mother, if the child would be born with a grave physical or mental defect, or if the pregnancy resulted from rape, incest, or other felonious intercourse. Z.P.G. has taken the position that what is needed is the repeal of abortion laws and not just reform. The vast majority of abortions are not performed for the above reasons but for socioeconomic reasons. Reform would not alter the basic situation or correct inequities existing between the poor and those who can afford abortions.

The pros and cons concerning abortion are often only discussed from the viewpoints of the rights of the foetus to life. Some other rights must also be given considerations. If a foetus has a moral right to life, then it must also have the right to be born wanted and loved. These two rights are often antagonistic. If a foetus has a right to life, it must also have a right to develop to its full genetic potential as a human being. The rights of the foetus must be balanced against the rights of the mother, against the rights of other children in the family, and against the rights of society and mankind.

To deny abortions to women who seek them is to impose the scruples of portions of the community upon the entire community by government sanction. There is not universal accord on when a united sperm and egg become an actual human being. Even the law at present does not equate the taking of foetal life with murder. There are differences in thought not only among religious groups but within each as well, the Catholic Church being no exception. By legalizing abortions those whose beliefs would not permit them to have abortions would not be forced to have one, but on the other hand others will not be denied the right to do what they deem morally correct.

Elizabeth Poulson is an active member of the Zero Population Growth movement in South Bend. She worked in the same organization at Yale University before moving this year to South Bend with her husband, who teaches in the biology department at Notre Dame.



Life in these Hallowed Halls: An Assessment

Joe Hotz

ONE of the first questions which might arise in a consideration of hall life is simply this: What is the ideal hall? Father Ernest Bartell, an assistant rector in Flanner Hall, describes a hall as "a kind of living situation which provides support for oneself and others, and which strengthens values not found in classrooms or extracurricular life. It must provide an environment in which non-task, non-academic living can flourish — where the constant pressure is somewhat alleviated." Father Bartell sees a need for a "community where people can relax" and where people care for one another. "Too often," he notes, "tensions and pressures mount to the point where people kindle a sense of hatred for themselves."

Fr. Thomas Chambers, Director of Student Residence and Rector of Morrissey Hall, feels hall members must have "a deep spirit of awareness and concern for one another and people must respect their fellow hall members." There must be a "high-spirited hall morale" so people get the feeling, "I do belong." Along with this "spirit of awareness and concern," Buz Imhoff, President of Badin Hall, stresses the need for "freedom and the ability to let oneself go, in a true hall community, while still being a responsible member to those around you." "By definition," St. Ed's President Bob Weaver notes, "a hall community must be an inherently friendly place." Also important to a hall is the development of a hall identity, so that one starts thinking "St. Ed's" as well as "Notre Dame."

The halls must also play a role in the learning process. Tom Belle, President of Pangborn, says a hall ought to supplement one's education in learning to deal with people. "One of the best parts of living in a hall is learning to face others and in facing others also learning to face oneself." Father Bartell sees the halls as a potential "Free University where intellectual interests other than those coming under conventional modes of learning can be considered. Halls must be a place to escape the class room, but they shouldn't become academically schizophrenic about learning."

There also seems to be a general consensus that most people want and see a need for communities to some extent within the halls. In fact it seems people cannot avoid them. "As soon as you have a roommate, you have a community," notes Tom Belle. Much of the need for community seems to go deeper. "I think much of it has to do with our present generation," Bob Weaver says. "Young people today want more in life — they are not satisfied with just living. People seem to want to be closer to others due to a sense of spiritual loss and such things as the war. Community might be a possible means."

Too often we all get taken away in our dreams and ideas of utopia. For dreams and ideas to have any utility they must be compared to reality. Hence, we must try to discern what is really happening in Notre Dame's halls. The reality of hall life can be examined under two categories — a hall's structures and organization, and the quality of life within.

Halls seem to have achieved, to a very great extent, a sufficient and autonomous structure. A great many gains have been made in the last few years in the areas of hall autonomy. Greater freedom has been made possible by such changes as parietal hours, more equitable judiciary procedures and, in general, less stringent and encompassing rules and regulation. So much has been done in fact that Father Bartell notes, "we no longer have the articulated concern or 'causes' for hall issues because so much has been accomplished. Halls have achieved so much structurally and organizationally that there is no longer the presence of a real rallying point around which everyone can unite." According to Father Chambers, "There now exists a much better process of cooperation between the hall staffs and the hall governments such that the halls can now offer so many more opportunities to students."

One phase of hall structure which seems to have come a long way is hall government. This development has greatly strengthened hall autonomy. As one hall president noted, "We still have some disagreements or friction between hall staffs and hall governments, but the hall government has generally been able to take care of most issues or problems by themselves, thus avoiding conflicts." There are, nevertheless, differing opinions on the role of hall government in providing leadership and impetus within the hall. Hall government has at least become conscious of its potential.

Father Bartell and Buz Imhoff view hall government in a less assertive role. "Hall government," claims Father Bartell, "is really no great force for institutional change. It certainly can be useful when called upon, but so much now seems to be of a more decentralized or personal concern." In Badin hall, hall government as such has been nearly eliminated. The hall conducts general hall meetings regularly and Imhoff states that attendance has been at least 50% or better. Overall, there seems to have been a great deal of progress made on eliminating institutional and regulational limitations which many felt were stumbling blocks to hall community.

"A lot of personalism," was Father Chambers' description of the quality of life in residence halls. Almost all the people questioned seemed to find their hall a fairly livable place. "Hall life is cohesive but



not sticky," Bob Weaver suggests. "St. Ed's is a very informal and close place." Buz Imhoff points out the aspect of responsibility as an indication of life in Badin. "Generally, when someone has his stereo turned up too loud, one feels free enough to walk into the guy's room and ask him to turn it down. That is an indication that people are fairly close to each other."

Perhaps the quality of life is just one of apathetic indifference to others — no real sense of concern. "Sometimes I wonder if hall life has really been improving or whether everyone is just apathetic about it," Father Bartell speculates. "The possibility of apathy worries me mainly because it's so plausible given our political climate. I certainly am hopeful that hall life and community are improving, for they can be a great source of personal blossoming."

It is obvious but important to note that the quality of life varies from section to section, from room to room. "There are just some people that you will never like or come to know," Tom Belle points out, "but usually you have people who you know and care about. We've got some really tightly knit sections here in Pangborn."

AFTER these rosy pictures of hall life it seems that there are no problems. Not so.

One of the biggest handicaps to hall community is the hall's physical limitations. With the exceptions of the new towers, none has large centralized areas

where people can congregate and meet. "The only place where all the guys meet around here is in the john," Bob Weaver states. "It's really hard to get everyone together when you don't have any place to facilitate such gatherings."

The halls, physically, were certainly improved by last year's renovations — such as the conversion of some rooms into suites and the installation of carpeting in the hallways. But there are still great problems in the physical arrangements of the dorms. They generally lack public rooms in which social events, seminars, discussion, or just general congregation can occur. Any work to be done in such areas generally falls on the hall members both physically and financially. And with people preoccupied with studies, it is rather hard to devote time to hall improvement. Also, the cost is too much of a burden on most halls. "We've just remodeled our lounge and chapel and hope to fix up a T.V. room," Tom Belle says, "but we'll probably go in debt on all of them because we just don't have the finances."

The problem would easily be solved if the University would or could supply the funds. But as Father Jerome Wilson, Vice-President for Business Affairs, explained, there are no funds available. If the University were to pay for such improvements, the students would end up paying about 60 cents out of every dollar by way of increased fees.

A second deficiency seems to be the cooperation between the Student Government and hall governments. There seems to be a lack of communications between the halls and the Student Government. One of David Krashna's important platforms was the increased presence of student government in the halls. "This isn't going to happen overnight, but we haven't seen



much of anything yet," Bob Weaver says. In some halls there seems to be an open animosity over this lack of communication. "I'm not blaming anybody, but a lot of guys in my hall really wonder what the Student Government is doing for the halls," Tom Belle says. "At times," Buz Imhoff says, "one really feels like a pawn for the student government. I realize that Dave and Mark are trying, but there just has to be more communication between the two groups. At times it is very hard to relate to campus government."

One of the most urgent needs of halls, which many feel should come from the campus government, is money. "The Senate in its considerations on money really overlooked the predicament of the halls," Tom Belle contends. "We don't charge a hall tax in Pangborn and I really find it hard to ask guys to kick in any more after they've shelled out nearly three thousand dollars already." The allocation given to the Hall President's Council will probably cover some of the Antotal cost but leave little to be divided up amongst the halls.

Finally, a deficiency which really must be present in any successful hall community is a sense of humanness. Less intense and frequent, but still very much present are the blaring parties which disturb the guy next door or the "grossing out" of some girl who comes to visit during the now-extended privilege of parietal visitation. The sad part about these two examples and the ones like it are that the people involved in these "injustices" seldom realize that their "victim" is another human being. An aspect of this humanness is the role females ought to play in the residence halls. Up until now they have just been *visitors*. But if co-education and more meaningful relationships are going to be aided by the more open policies in the halls, women

are going to have to be allowed to assume a more integral part of hall communities. The personal hang-ups that exist concerning male-female relations are not going to be abated by institutional changes. Deep, individual, human changes are necessary to improve relationships with females as well as with the guy who lives next door.

THIS assessment is certainly narrow in its scope and may be rather presumptuous in its conclusions: the topic is a broad and diverse one. Nevertheless certain general conclusions can be made. Hall life has greatly improved over the past few years. A hall today is a much more open and free place to live. But the reality of community still is not all that it can or must be.

Things still need to be done. But the things to be done are very human and individual changes. With the hall structures now more flexible and open, people can pretty much make halls what they want. If community is going to exist, people must give of themselves in a very individual way to those about them. This process of giving is painful, but if Notre Dame life is to be more than just four years of work for a paper diploma, people must develop a community, sensitized and human.

What will it take? As Bob Weaver speculates, "If we are ever going to have communities, it is going to take a concentrated emphasis from all segments of this university." ■

michael cervas

a poem forgotten

THE Auditorium Theatre in Chicago is a strange and impressive place. Constructed in the 1870's and renovated after the second World War, the building radiates the aura of the classical theatre; baroquely decorated, spacious, and magnificently theatrical in design; blessed nevertheless, with many modern conveniences and excellent lighting and stage facilities. I arrived there early for the performance of the American Ballet Company and comfortably situated myself in the wooden seats of the second balcony—seemingly at least one thousand feet above the auditorium floor. Within minutes my head was swimming (since the seats of the second balcony are slanted so as to allow the theatre-goer a more precipitous view but in reality giving one the constant sensation of falling forward). In the standard procedure, I waited until the performance was ready to begin and secretively secured a better seat on the main floor of the theatre. The lights dimmed; I leaned comfortably back and prepared, with all the apprehension and wonder of a child experiencing something for the first time, to critically review the American Ballet Company.

Formed by Eliot Feld almost three years ago, the company has gradually been building a sound reputation for technical excellence and originality in the New York area where it now rivals the American Ballet Theatre and the Geoffrey Center Ballet. Until he established his own company, Feld danced with the American Ballet Theatre, where he was widely acclaimed as a superb dancer with a romantic and creative flair that permeated his style. All of the vigor and imagination that characterized Feld as a dancer are applied by Feld, the director, and Feld, the choreographer, in his own company. The American Ballet Company consists of twelve dancers (including Feld), two technical directors, a pianist and a costume designer. The dancers are all young and have received their classical training at the New York School of Ballet. As conceived by Feld, the company is a creative attempt to fuse classical ballet movements with contemporary themes, stage and lighting techniques, and modern dance.

Even after the first few minutes of the first dance, there was no doubt in my mind that Feld is a genius in choreography and that he had assembled a remarkably talented group of performers. The dance was impeccably designed and constantly surprised me in its

imaginative wanderings. Entitled "The Harbinger," the dance was an especially fine one with which to begin the performance; a harbinger being, after all, one who initiates a major change. The dancers radiated the mystery and wonder of discovery—and Feld's discovery was the way in which classical ballet can combine with modern dance techniques to express lyrically (and more fully) contemporary and classical themes. The lighting itself, now fiery red, now lavender, now pale yellow, now bright blue, perfectly fitted the mood and theme of the dance.

Beginning in typically classical style, the movements at first were all formal, the choreography stylized. But as the lighting (originally a somber blue) and music (with the addition of drums and occasional dissonance) moved freely towards chaos, the order of the dance broke down. The dancers froze in apprehension at the discovery of something new, something different. The choreography captured this momentary anxiety, touched almost with fear, and suddenly turned it into a beautiful moment of (forever) wonder as the company reeled into a compacted group, arms limp at the sides and heads turned in wonder towards the discovery. A dance that had begun in formal movements ended in the quiet, hushed sigh of a change accomplished. The symmetry of the beginning ended in the mysterious irregularity of the final movement.

The very way in which Christine Sarry, perhaps the best female dancer of the company, struggled in intimate contact with Feld in a movement silhouetted against the faint blue backdrop represented the struggle between the ordered yet muscular classical movements and the free and passionate movements of modern dance. The Harbinger surely indicated a resolution to this struggle—the possibility of drawing from both classical and modern traditions in order to make a lyrical statement about a universal theme, in this case the theme of discovery and change.

If "The Harbinger" heralded a change in ballet, the second dance, "Consort," epitomized and expressed this change. With the ordered accompaniment of Renaissance music, the dance began in the formal style of a Renaissance ball. The dancers wore colorful and full-length formal costumes and the lighting was a brilliant blue. Even here, in a particularly classical movement, Feld's imagination and talent as a choreographer per-

the american ballet company

meated the dance. The design and motion of the first several movements of Consort were *uniquely* classical and *freely* formal. Again the dance proceeded as the evening would; and the formal air of the early movements evaporated as the ball gradually became an after-the-ball party. The deep blue lighting dimmed somewhat; and in a strange, and I thought beautiful way, the female dancers changed costume on stage—in the same manner that someone today, for example, would remove his sportcoat and loosen his tie after the formal party in preparation for the wild fun to come.

And the dance did indeed become wildly free. Separating into two groups, the dancers sought alternately to outdo each other in short folk-like interpretative dances. These short dances provided some of the most remarkable and exciting moments of the evening. As the female dancers pinned up their long dresses, Feld himself interpreted a solo folk-dance. I was totally enraptured with the impression of spontaneity that Feld was able to project in this dance. The other members of the company, as well as the audience, were united in experiencing the classical beauty and frantic freedom that was embodied in Feld's dance. Quite understandably "Consort" ended with a short dance in which both groups united to signify the end of the evening, the consummation of the party. "Consort" indeed gave significance to the change discovered in "The Harbinger" in its imaginative expression of how this change alters and expands the possibilities of ballet.

THE final two dances of the performance, it seemed to me, were creative attempts to carry through this change in dealing first with an essentially modern dance and then with a fundamentally classical one. The third dance, entitled "A Poem Forgotten," is one of Feld's most recent productions. A gigantic impressionistic drawing, barely illuminated by the faint yellow-brown glow that lights the entire dance, serves as the backdrop. "A Poem Forgotten" deals poignantly with the various stages of life: the combination of joy and fear in learning to walk; the irrational anger that swells within the veins of hatred; the wonderfully mysterious sensation of making love for the first time; the agony of growing old.


There is a fundamental lack of symmetry in this dance and many things are going on at the same time.

As the dancers rolled on the ground, groaned and groped in contorted and distorted movements, the choreography caught, in the chaotic irregularity of the dance, the irrational and chaotic essence of life today. The dancers embodied (at the same time) hope and hopelessness, joy and sorrow. The dance ended with an absurd note as Feld appeared whimsically at one end of the stage and crept comically across it as the curtain dropped. But even though the theme and movements of "A Poem Forgotten" were contemporary, the classical training of the company was put to good use. It would be difficult to imagine a more tender and painful impression of the ultimate meaninglessness of life without being aware of the ever-present classical traditions that Feld expands in this dance. "A Poem Forgotten" succeeded ultimately in relating creatively the techniques of classical ballet and modern dance.

The final dance, Feld's celebrated "Early Works," however, failed finally to combine these two traditions. For all the brilliance of the choreography and all the passion and talent of the dancers' interpretations, "Early Works" seemed to me to finally limit the possibilities of ballet that Feld is exploring in the American Ballet Company. Probably one of the reasons that I thought "Early Works" failed was the use of Richard Strauss' music—I simply find most of his works (and especially his *early works*) uninspiring. In any event, the dance itself as a unified total impression fell short of the splendid potentialities that Feld had established and explored throughout the performance. The freedom of modern dance, the use of lighting to express the mood of the dance, and the lack of symmetry and order in contemporary choreography just did not work to express the emotions and feelings of Strauss' songs about meadows and flowers.

Even the brilliance and originality of the company could not make "Early Works" succeed. The point is not that Strauss is incapable of being expressed in ballet as Feld conceives it, but only that some of Strauss cannot be so expressed—there are finally limitations in combining classical ballet and modern dance traditions.

Nevertheless, Eliot Feld's American Ballet Company leaves one with the final impression of discovering a new and fertile direction in dance, pregnant with possibilities for expanding its capacity to embody and express man's deepest being.



another man's richness

Rory Holscher and John Hessler. The problem of articulation concerning a voice one can only sense. Perhaps it is the momentary recognition of another man's richness through his art. Perhaps solved through the cataloguing of specifics. Perhaps it is never solved on paper alone, but only together with memory—in co-operation with others, in agreement.

The forms of art have the advantage of the archaic seashell, which was kept when empty, as a horn or vessel.

(Rory Holscher)

A poetry reading by students Rory Holscher and John Hessler opened the University Arts Councils new lounge area this past Sunday. It was the first in a series of poetry readings by Notre Dame students and faculty planned by the Arts Council. The lounge, which has been in a state of renovation for one month, will serve as a kind of small performing arts center. The opening reading seemed to be at least as impressive as any other poetry reading at Notre Dame in the past few years, in both content and (more importantly) the communion achieved between poet and audience. The atmosphere found in the Arts Center seems ideal. Part of the reading's success must be attributed to the type of intimacy

possible in such an atmosphere (if only we could have heard Tom Raworth read there).

In a room whose floor is covered with thirty dollars of Salvation Army rugs, whose walls were never really dusted, only painted over, and where one dusty chest of drawers became one very substantial podium, the rapport between reader and audience was high.

The most unfortunate thing about the writing of poetry in a college environment is that one ultimately is labeled a student poet. This term seems to imply a poet that is in some mysterious way not as effective, not yet writing poetry as good as other "poets." The range of their material, the consistency of the poetry itself and the subsequent balance of the individual readings would seem to preclude the use of a term like "student."


The most impressive thing, however, was the range of each poet's voice. The range of Holscher's voice remains authoritative yet never overly heavy; in the theory, in each poem and in the way he moves from his more lyric work to the dense mythic explorations of his regional poems.

Hessler's "Fragments of a Suicide," the richness and breadth of the material, of the allusions—all this showing the poet, his historical and honest self. The two poets together offered the audience one very important

vehicle to view them with, a communion. They, slightly wiser, attempting to give that wisdom; their listeners, close and open, ready to share it.

The high quality of student poetry at Notre Dame has gone largely unnoticed. It is, quite simply, among the best being written in America in these last years—years that have seen an explosion of poetic expression all through the country in and out of university communities. That fact ought to be understood if poetry here is to grow in some communal atmosphere—which means, if poetry is to grow at all, if it is to exist for anyone past the poet.


—Rick Fitzgerald



THE FALL EDITION OF
JUGGLER IS ON
ITS WAY

WORK BY
MICHAEL PATRICK O'CONNOR
JOHN STUPP
ROB BARTELETTI
RICK FITZGERALD
AND SEVERAL NEW VOICES

"FREEDOM IS THE
RECOGNITION OF POETRY"
—M.P.O'C.



Time or Times? a conversation with the new voice

Last Wednesday, a sedate discussion between four campus media people being broadcast over WSND was instantly transformed into a frantic and confused thirty-second scenario that approached bedlam by one small telephone call — announcing the formation of a new campus publication. Its founders identified it as the Notre Dame Voice, talked briefly about their plans on the phone that night, and headed off to Louie's to celebrate the birth. A few days later, the SCHOLASTIC managed to catch up with the two men responsible for both the excitement and the publication: Publisher Chuck Ryan, a senior who recently returned to Notre Dame from two years in the Army; and Editor Jim Holsinger, formerly News Editor and Circulation Manager for the Observer. The conversation follows.

Scholastic: Would you start out by explaining just how and when you got the idea?

Ryan: It sort of started with reading the paper last year when I came back to Notre Dame. The daily paper really needed some changes in it. And it wasn't of very high quality. The SCHOLASTIC didn't fill the gap because the SCHOLASTIC was doing another thing altogether. During Student Body elections, I decided the daily newspaper on campus needed a very objective or middle approach to things. Then, this year there was the whole problem of the resignation and so on. And suspending publication for one day with a big shake-up. The thought's been growing in my mind and the people I've talked to, and just recently Jim and I and a few other people have been talking about the need for another publication. We really weren't planning on announcing anything. We were having a meeting last Wednesday night, and somebody was listening to WSND. We just decided that we were sure enough of ourselves that we would call up and make an announcement. That was sort of a spur-of-the-moment thing when these decisions were announced.

Holsinger: The need for this thing became crystal clear to me when the *Observer* didn't jell this year. I left them for personal reasons and just simply because it wasn't developing. It didn't jell, it didn't give people

any opportunity to be writers, to be creative. It was a dead end as far as writing goes. There's just so far you can go with the news; the Features page doesn't go anywhere, doesn't do anything, doesn't say anything. The editorials are written by people who have been there so long that nobody is on it really. It's such a big group, it has to be done at a table with nine or ten people, so it really leaves no opportunity for a little man to really develop. And I saw the SCHOLASTIC was doing its own thing and the best writers on campus were all drawn into it; drawn away from news, away from the things I think a writer ought to have the opportunity to do. To me there should be a place where people could write. There are people who feel they can't write for the SCHOLASTIC, because it is elitist. And there are people who feel they can't write for the *Observer*, first of all, because of its impure objectives and, secondly, because it's a dead end.

Scholastic: What do you think of those two criticisms?

Holsinger: I think they're very real.

Scholastic: In what way would you say SCHOLASTIC is elitist?

Holsinger: Well, first of all, it develops its writers for four years. They become a single group who write a particular type of a story. It is limited in readership. I don't see how you can possibly maintain that you are communicating with the average student around here. That you can give him some insight, some idea of what's going on here. It is a very fine thing; I just don't think it can serve the function, rather a function that needs concern.

Scholastic: Do you think that any publication can bridge that gap?

Holsinger: I hope so.

Scholastic: How are you going to do it?

Holsinger: OK. I think there are things going on here which can't be defined or covered by a story which leads you down the path to a conclusion, which would start with an objective in mind and develop that into



something. I think that what goes on here is more a spirit and a breath. I've envisioned a type of publication which explores all kinds of aspects of a problem. I think that's something we should feel.

Scholastic: Maybe we can begin with your specific criticisms both of the *Observer* and the SCHOLASTIC. What do you want to do as opposed to what we have now?

Ryan: I feel generally that the need which has to be filled is a need, not particularly the need the SCHOLASTIC can fill.

Scholastic: What would be your alternative way?

Holsinger: Publications, particularly at this campus, should be motivators, that is, they should give people the information they need to work with, to work. Something has to be done. Because this campus is dead, really dead. I blame that on the fact that people are misinformed and apathetic. If we really gave them a feeling of what's going on, then, perhaps, they would be motivated. The SCHOLASTIC appeals to a limited number of people.

Scholastic: Do you object to the way the media is presenting things, or to the things it's talking about?

Ryan: The lack we're talking about is something that we haven't provided, the Student Government hasn't provided, the Administration hasn't provided, that isn't provided here. It's a discussion of a lack, not restricted to the media. It's pretty hard to pin down. I was gone for two years, in another country. When I returned, the things that to me would be the signs of change at Notre Dame hadn't changed.

Scholastic: How did the publication finally come about?

Holsinger: Start with the incident of last week, which really made us mad. It was Monday morning's *Observer* story about Sunday's Senate meeting. The amount of money the Afro-American Society was finally voted was never reported; comments on both sides were generally eliminated. The whole sense and feeling of the meeting was missed: there was a lot of racist tenor to the evening. We complained about that to the *Observer*.

They answered by saying they never expected their reporter to know all that or have that sense. Why do you write that kind of thing then? They proceeded to print us a correction, on Tuesday, which still gave no sense of the meeting. Wednesday they came out with another article which also gave no sense of the meeting but had the Tuesday corrections wrong again. That was the motivator: its news stories are aimed at a specific, small area and many times can't get the bigger sense of what they're doing.

Scholastic: How often do you want to come out?

Ryan: That depends on the format we choose, and we won't really decide until we get some money.

Scholastic: What kind of format will you choose?

Ryan: We've already discussed a news weekly, but that would mean the same pressures the SCHOLASTIC and *Observer* fall victim to. . . . And in a way there would be a competition, and we don't really want to compete, because if we're competing, say, against the *Observer's* slant, then we have to come out with a counter slant. The thing we don't want is that slant; we'd like to present what's going on here. And the very big things especially. Let the people at Notre Dame know what the problem really means. . . .

Scholastic: What kind of staff do you have?

Holsinger: I'd estimate at twenty right now.

Scholastic: Where will you get your money?

Ryan: We're looking into advertising, and we've actually had a few people volunteer sums of money as donations. We're working on a couple of things in hopes of getting a large sum of money. But we're not sure exactly where yet. . . . We'll get the money if we get something together.

Scholastic: How much will you need?

Holsinger: Again, that depends on the format we choose. We need enough to get out one issue, because we're not sure we will make it but we are sure we'll offer something good. So we'd probably need \$500 to get out one issue. . . . The idea is in the name: when



you hear a voice you don't exactly know what to do with it. We hope to have something that won't be thrown away without being read. We hope to have some original formats so that when you pick it up, you'd know it was different. . . .

Scholastic: Let's get back to what you call an "objective investigation." Do you think that's really possible?

Ryan: We think it's possible to do. We're not sure if once we get down to it, we're actually going to come up with it. But we're convinced it's possible.

Holsinger: I'd rather say "honest" than "objective." You can be interpretive and still be honest. . . . Some interpretation does come into it. When you sit at a Senate meeting you get a sense of what's going on these days and you try to give that to someone else the best way you can. . . .

Scholastic: What kind of slant do the *SCHOLASTIC* and *Observer* have?

Ryan: Well, for instance, the *Observer* is slanted against David Krashna. We need something that doesn't have a slant. Student Government is slanted, too: for example, against the Administration. That's wasting a lot of time, keeping up defenses. I don't think that's necessary.

Scholastic: Will the *Voice* ever come out with an editorial?

Ryan: It probably will, but it will be harder to write one. . . . We'd like to not do them. Lots of people are writing editorials around here. . . .

Scholastic: What besides co-education do you want to talk about?

Ryan: Black concentrations, the whole black problem, ROTC, living on campus, dining halls, etc.

Scholastic: Any black writers on the staff?

Ryan: We have one, with the possibility of several more. We have four St. Mary's students.

Scholastic: How would you approach the story on black concentrations?

Ryan: Last year I found out a lot just through the campaign. David was asked about it. And I found out it wasn't a black ghetto, not even an all-black floor. Yet people were getting upset about them. People still don't know what it is or why the blacks in it are there. . . . You might talk to the black freshmen who refused to move into that concentration. . . . We'd try to find out what kind of blacks are on this campus: poor, middle-class or what kind of backgrounds they have. . . .

Scholastic: How do you see your publishing policy? If someone disagreed with what you think, would you let them publish?

Ryan: We haven't worked that out yet, really. But it would be hard for Jim and I to put it out ourselves.

Holsinger: We're looking for the person who feels he can't write for the *Observer* or for the *SCHOLASTIC*.

Scholastic: Why would someone feel that way?

Holsinger: I just think the *SCHOLASTIC* is kind of elite. But it's hard for me to put my finger exactly on it.

Scholastic: What you're talking about sounds suspiciously like *Time*. Which isn't exactly a paragon.

Ryan: Ed McCartin says it would come out something between the *New York Times* and *Harper's*. Hopefully we're talking about what concerns just about everyone on the campus. . . . We talk about a voice. What we see is a lack at Notre Dame. What we're trying to do is to fill that need. The way we've chosen is through a publication. And the way we hope to get people to see we're trying to fill the need, and read the publication, is to appeal to them by having something unique and something very creative.

coming distractions

On November 23 and 24 at 7:00 and 9:30 p.m., the Knights of Columbus and the N.D. English Department will present **Orson Welles' "Othello."** Welles produced and directed the movie, and also stars in it. Admission is fifty cents and all proceeds will go to **Sister Marita's School.**

David Rowe, a political scientist from Yale, and member of the Asian Study Program, will lecture on Southeast Asia, Tuesday, December 1, at 8 p.m. in the Library Auditorium.

Dr. Wyatt Tee Walker will speak on "**The Myths of Black Anti-Semitism**" Wednesday, December 2, in the Library Auditorium.

Pacifist **Dorothy Day** of "Daily Worker Paper" fame, will lecture Thursday, December 3, at 8 p.m. in Carroll Hall at St. Mary's College.

Clare Bishop will speak on the "**Role of Christianity in the Middle East,**" Monday, December 7, at 8 p.m. in the Library Auditorium.

Jesse Unruh, who lost an election but won the support of the **Berkeley Tribe**, will lecture at 8 p.m. on December 8. Also, the Cultural Arts Commission will present "**Blow Up**" at 7:30 and 9:30 p.m.

An invitation has been extended to **Bishop Pursley** to speak on either December 11 or 12, but as of yet, the good **Bishop** has not responded.

"**Figure and Shadow,**" a show of paintings and drawings by **Rev. James Flanigan, C.S.C.**, is on display in Moreau Gallery of St. Mary's College until December 9.

The Notre Dame Art Gallery is currently featuring, through **December 20**, a display of graphics and paintings by Notre Dame's Professor of Graphics, **Douglas Kinsey.**

Cinema '70 will present **Susan Sontag's** sometimes-acclaimed, sometimes-bombed "**Duet for Cannibals**" December 12 and 13 at 2:00 and 8:00 p.m. in the Engineering Auditorium. Admission is one dollar, solo: Cinema '71 patrons free.

—Tom Gora

football

Notre Dame over Louisiana State—A Floridian sportswriter told me after last week's game that "since you guys only beat Tech by three, and since they got creamed by Auburn whom LSU beat, you're really gonna get it next week." Lessee now, Air Force beat Stanford, but lost to Oregon who tied with Army last week. Anybody think Army can beat Stanford? The Bayou Bengals'll need more than distorted logic to stop the "big, fat, sloppy linemen" tomorrow.

Ohio State over Michigan—Or, better yet, "Woody Hayes over Bo Schembechler." Both teams are pretty evenly matched squads. It'll boil down to a game of strategy where Woody gets the nod. The Bucks haven't lost in Columbus in three years.

Southern California over UCLA—Second game of the TV doubleheader.

The UCLans were simply destroyed by Washington last week. An interesting game to watch considering who the Trojans' next opponent is.

Penn State over Pittsburgh—Should Dartmouth falter, a possible Lambert Trophy award could go to the Nittany Lions with a win here. A few bowl bids could also be coming their way.

Syracuse over Miami (Fla.)—The Orangemen close their season at home on a winning note, giving them a respectable 6-4 record considering the problems they had at the year's beginning.

Northwestern over Michigan State—Thus putting State under .500 for the second year in a row. Should Ohio State lose, the Wildcats will be in a tie for Rose Bowl honors and a vote of Big Ten coaches will be the deciding factor.

by don kennedy

New Mexico over Arizona State—Just a hunch that one more unbeaten team will drop from the ranks this week.

Yale over Harvard—The Elis squeaked out a 7-0 decision last year, but should have no trouble in tomorrow's renewal of one of college football's oldest rivalries.

New York Giants over Philadelphia Eagles—This week's chapter of "A Night With Howard Cosell." You can be sure ol' Howard'll be pluggin' away for the New York boys. Giants have won six straight.

and, looking ahead to next week, **Army over Navy**—Farewell, Rick Forzano, we'll all miss you.

Record to date: 41 Right, 18 Wrong, 1 Tie, Pct. .695.

It Should Be an Interesting Season

Last year the Notre Dame hockey team swept to a 21-8-1 record, a record that can be rather misleading when one considers the general weakness of the 1969 schedule. The team itself flashed with glimmerings of greatness, but lacked a hard-hitting defensive unit capable of high-calibre play.

For 1970, both the schedule and the defensive lines have been vastly improved over last year. The Irish enter the fray as new "probationary" members of the Western Collegiate Hockey Association (WCHA) and

"Freshman winger Eddie Bumbacco skates on the first line in tonight's opener against Michigan Tech."



"Last year's co-captain Phil Witliff is back again in the center slot on the Irish third-line offense."



Concerning the schedule in general and the WCHA in particular, Coach Charles "Lefty" Smith had this to say: "This will be a very difficult season. The competition is so close (that) you could win on Friday and lose on Saturday. For example, last year Colorado College, whom we had success with, finished in last place. But if they had just gotten nine goals over the season in key places, they would've finished first. If we can go 10-10 in our league we would be in good shape. Overall, we would consider an above .500 season a success. The team is 25% improved over last year, but the schedule has to be at least 50% tougher."

Now, what about the defense? Last year a sputtering attack was bolstered by the addition of a corps of quick and aggressive freshman front-liners, and it looks like it'll be up to three rookies again to revitalize a sluggish Irish defense. Three freshmen have won starting positions on the first two defensive lines. Ric Schafer (5-8, 185 lbs.), an all-stater from Minneapolis, will skate opposite last year's hard-hitting standout, Bill Green. The all-Frosh second line will feature another Gopher all-stater, Bill Nyrop (6-2, 190 lbs.) and fellow-Minnesotan Steve Curry (5-11, 182 lbs.). Coach Smith feels that the success of these three freshman additions could be the key to a productive season.

The offensive lines will be loaded with rookie talent. Soph Paul Regan centers the first line for frosh wingers Eddie Bumbacco (5-11, 165 lbs., from Sault Ste. Marie, Ont.) and Ian Williams (6-0, 185 lbs., from Toronto, Ont.). Freshman Larry Israelson (6-1, 170 lbs., from Didsbury, Alb.) handles second-line centering duties for veteran wingers John Roselli and Kevin Hoene. Third-line spots fall to center Phil Witliff and wingers Gary "Smokey" Little and Joe Bonk, perhaps an indication of the talent of the new freshmen, considering that all three of these icers skated on the first and second lines last year. John Noble, the outstanding center who paced Notre Dame in point production with 59 (on 24 goals

Regular netminder Dick Tomasoni returns with two varsity years experience to his credit. The owner of every Notre Dame goaltending record but one, this stalwart junior lowered his goals-against average by one full point (from 4.5 to 3.5) from his first season of action. But yet another freshman, Mark Kronholm, and soph Chris Cathcart will be sure to keep Tomasoni hard-pressed for his job.

Lefty expects "great years out of Tomasoni, Regan, Noble, Bumbacco and Williams. Without a doubt, this is the best crop of freshmen we ever recruited." Perhaps, as Lefty feels, the foundation of a future NCAA contender may lie in the success of the highly touted recruits. But one cannot fail to overlook that, despite apparent strengthening of key positions with new additions, the Irish still face what could be considered one of the toughest schedules facing a team in the west this year. It is conceivable that Notre Dame may falter to a dismal season simply because the competition is much more rugged than in past years. The key, then, may lie not so much in the team's talent (which they have) but in their stamina in being able to survive the season.

Lefty was quick to make one other point. "No other school has attempted what Notre Dame has so quickly. Wisconsin waited through six years of recruiting and building before joining the WCHA, and even then they finished fifth. We've done it in three years and feel confident that our squad will fare very well in league play. Besides, we've got the Notre Dame spirit going for us."

That may be so, but it'll take more than spirit to master the likes of Michigan Tech, Denver and Duluth. Just to give you an indication of just how tough it'll be for the Irish icers this year, consider this: Wisconsin, who've handled Notre Dame easily over the past two years, carrying basically the same squad as last year, were simply creamed by Tech last weekend. In fact, in one of the two games Wisconsin lost to them, they were outshot 46-12. It should be an interesting season.

—Don Kennedy

<p align="center"><i>Notre Dame Hockey 1970-71</i></p> <p align="center">•</p> <p align="center"><i>indicates WCHA conference games</i></p>			
	<i>Home Games</i>		<i>Away Games</i>
● Dec. 11 (Fri.) Michigan State	7:30 P.M.		● Nov. 20 (Fri.) at Michigan Tech 8:00 P.M.
● Dec. 12 (Sat.) Michigan State	7:30 P.M.		● Nov. 21 (Sat.) at Michigan Tech 8:00 P.M.
● Dec. 19 (Sat.) Wisconsin	7:30 P.M.		Dec. 28-29 Boston Arena Christmas Tourney Boston U., Providence, Northeastern
● Dec. 20 (Sun.) Wisconsin	2:00 P.M.		Dec. 30 (Wed.) at Boston College 8:00 P.M.
● Jan. 22 (Fri.) North Dakota	7:30 P.M.		Jan. 8 (Fri.) at Air Force 8:00 P.M.
● Jan. 23 (Sat.) North Dakota	7:30 P.M.		Jan. 9 (Sat.) at Air Force 8:00 P.M.
● Feb. 5 (Fri.) Denver	7:30 P.M.		● Jan. 12 (Tue.) at Colorado College 7:30 P.M.
● Feb. 6 (Sat.) Denver	7:30 P.M.		● Jan. 13 (Wed.) at Colorado College 7:30 P.M.
Feb. 27 (Sat.) Bowling Green	7:30 P.M.		● Jan. 15 (Fri.) at Denver 8:00 P.M.
Mar. 12 (Fri.) Air Force	7:30 P.M.		● Jan. 16 (Sat.) at Denver 8:00 P.M.
Mar. 13 (Sat.) Air Force	7:30 P.M.		● Jan. 29 (Fri.) at Michigan State 8:00 P.M.
			● Jan. 30 (Sat.) at Michigan State 8:00 P.M.
			● Feb. 12 (Fri.) at Minnesota-Duluth 8:00 P.M.
			● Feb. 13 (Sat.) at Minnesota-Duluth 8:00 P.M.
			● Feb. 19 (Fri.) at Michigan 8:00 P.M.
			● Feb. 20 (Sat.) at Michigan 8:00 P.M.
			Feb. 26 (Fri.) at Bowling Green 7:30 P.M.

the last word

A. walked up Fifth Avenue and turned left, into Rockefeller Center, glancing only for a moment over his shoulder at the shadow of St. Patrick's across the street. It was December and the hard winter sun that sometimes manages to reach Manhattan's streets was cold enough to touch.

Past the skaters up the steps of the building his father had told him (repeatedly) held the offices of the Associated Press. Just the place for you to start. Just the place. He heard the voice even now, though the morning already seemed miles away.

Just the place.

A. walked to the floor index, looked up "Employment—7th floor." A copy of this week's *Village Voice*, a box of lemon drops: he was ready. He was quite taken with the daring symbolized by that copy of the *Voice*. A real show-him-where-you're-at move, he was sure.

When the elevator opened, A. stepped off into an abyss of golden carpet, at the other end of which, just barely visible from such a distance, sat a receptionist. She looked out from behind a hardwood desk bigger than his dining room table when it was pulled out as far as it could go for company.

I'd like to apply for a job.

A. was led into a small room and, watched by six other people in it, took an "Application for Employment Form 6-B" in hand. He noticed it asked no questions about his experience as a reporter. He was glad. He also decided that probably came in the interview.

All went smoothly until, just above the place where the Prospective Employee of the Associated Press Corporation signed his name, he noticed the following statement:

I do hereby pledge and declare that I will support the Constitution of the United States, and that I have never been and do not intend to be a member of the Communist Party or any other group planning the subversion or violent overthrow of this Nation.

A. had almost skipped over it. He normally signed applications and such without reading carefully. His lips tightened.

It was clear that he could not sign. It was also clear he had a good twenty minute wait before his turn came to be interviewed. He clutched his *Voice* tighter, clenched his teeth and began going over and over the statement he would make when he got inside that inner office. He could see it all: the man would be impressed by his credentials, overwhelmed by his personality and ambition. He would be ready to hire him right then. But he would see the statement. Unsigned. Then, as A. saw it, he would offer the application back with a here you must have forgotten smile.

And then, then A. would stand up straight and say:

As for me, what ever independence I can bear seems precious to me, something not to be sold for a bit of money, or a bit of security, or the approval of a few of the leaders of a corrupt and desperate society.

He had read that somewhere, though exactly where escaped him at the moment. It was all perfectly clear.

But A. was not allowed many more mental calisthenics. Another door opened, he was helloed into the small office. He sat down, hands pressed white against the chair. He awaited the signal to spring.

The man sped over his application, looked puzzled (ah, A. thought, he's reached the statement. At last!), gazed at A. for one moment and said,

Son, you're on the wrong floor. This is where we hire the kitchen help. You want the fifth floor.

Before A. could say one word he had turned to greet the next applicant.

A. walked back across the gold carpet, into the elevator and plummeted straight down past five (past even four) to the ground floor. He ate a lemon drop, walked out the front door and into the shadow of St. Patrick's again. It had only moved slightly, the shadow that is.

He was quite confused. But, standing, he remembered again where he had read his little speech. It was part of a statement made by W. S. Merwin before a reading at the State University of New York at Buffalo. The poet, A. remembered now, had been asked to sign a loyalty oath before he was paid for the reading. He had refused and had read that night for free.

Then, beneath the cacophony of Manhattan in the afternoon, and the strange anger such oaths inevitably gave birth to, A. quickened as the rest of Merwin's statement danced inside his head. Ah, if only he had remembered in time. If only he had had the chance to speak, to say what Merwin had said:

I hope there is never a better time to say that I believe that the insistence on individual liberty and poetry itself rise from the same source—what Keats called the truth of the imagination, and what others have called the human spirit.

Standing there, A. could only smile madly and imagine the man's shock when such words poured from the mouth of a potwasher!

—Steve Brion

THE SCHOLASTIC



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